Religious Reasons for Campbell’s View of Emotional Appeals in *Philosophy of Rhetoric*

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Reading Campbell’s *Philosophy of Rhetoric* from a rhetorical perspective—as an attempt to address issues relevant to religious rhetoric—I argue that Campbell's aims of preparing future ministers to preach and defending the authority of revealed religion shaped, first, his conception of inventing and presenting emotional appeals and, second, his key assumptions about reason and passion. The article adds a chapter to accounts of the relationship between reason and passion in sacred rhetorics and in rhetorical traditions more generally, and addresses the question of what Campbell’s theory of rhetoric may aim to inculcate or cultivate emotionally and why.

If we would speak of Things as they are, we must allow, that all the Art of Rhetorick, besides Order and Clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of Words Eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong Ideas, move the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheat.

(John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*)

[When I was dissuading the populace of Caesarea in Mauretania from civil war [. . .] I pleaded in the grand style in so far as I was able that they should cast forth from their hearts and customs such a ferocious and inveterate evil. But I did not think that I had done anything when I heard them applauding, but when I saw them weeping. [. . . T]ears indicated that they were persuaded. When I saw these, I believed that the terrible custom handed down by their fathers and grandfathers and from still more remote times, which had besieged their hearts like an enemy, or rather taken them, had been overcome, even before the victory had been demonstrated.

(Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine*)

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These epigraphs indicate the contested status of emotional appeals in theories of rhetoric and in religious rhetoric. Locke’s “almost pathological fear of religious emotion” (Cragg 10) contrasts sharply with St. Augustine’s report of how his eloquence moved hearers to tears. For Augustine emotional appeals cure disorder; for Locke they cause it. Emotional appeals may be understood not only as instrumental in persuasion but also as inviting identification. They may aim to solicit emotional performances that mark an audience’s consubstantiality with some collective and division from another. For example the more orthodox members of the Church of England in the eighteenth century could refuse to be moved by John Wesley’s so-called fanatic manner of preaching—a style that appealed to workers in manufacturing towns outside of London. Thus emotional appeals are implicated in religious identity as well as sociopolitical power.¹

Miller has asserted that “Every theory of discourse contains an epistemology, an ethics, and a politics, for every theory models what can be known, how people should respond, and what purposes are to be served” (223). Following Conley (ix), I view theories of rhetoric as arguments for what rhetoric ought to be and as responses to practical circumstances. Now, consider the case of George Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776), widely acknowledged to be a key text in rhetorical traditions. Campbell purports to present a universal theory of communication, seeming to locate discourse less in civic scenes such as the senate and bar than in faculties of mind such as reason and passion. The epistemological orientation of this work probably accounts for the tendency of Campbell scholarship to focus on how Campbell addresses epistemological issues. In this article I read Philosophy of Rhetoric from what may be described as a rhetorical perspective—as Campbell’s attempt to address issues relevant to religious rhetoric including the place of emotional appeals in preaching and in scriptural interpretation. The essay focuses on two of Campbell’s main religious activities—preparing future ministers to preach and defending the authority of revealed religion—and argues that these activities shaped, first, his conception of inventing and presenting emotional appeals and, second, his key assumptions about reason and passion.²

In doing so it aims to add a chapter to accounts of the relationship between reason and passion in sacred rhetorics and in rhetorical traditions more generally,³ and to address the more general question of what a theory of rhetoric—in this case Campbell’s—may aim to inculcate or cultivate emotionally and why. Religion is an appropriate entrée into issues regarding emotional appeals in theories of rhetoric since the best explanation for why emotional appeals began to receive more attention in theories of rhetoric in the seventeenth century is
“the rhetorical activity spawned by the Reformation and Counterreformation” (Conley 155) and since emotion is a central, perhaps the essential, feature of religion.  

In addition, this article aims to contribute to our understanding of a touchstone in rhetorical traditions in three main ways. First, it considers whether Campbell’s *Philosophy of Rhetoric* offers a theory of invention and, if so, what it is. Scholars have differed on the issue of whether he offers a theory of invention. Those who hold that he does have differed on issues such as whether it is an attenuation of classical systems or something fundamentally different. Here I argue that he offers a theory of inventing emotional appeals analogous to a classical “place” system of invention. Second, this article complements broad explanations of Campbell’s view of emotional appeals. Certainly “emerging democracy” helps to explain the surfacing of disagreements over basic values which, in turn, may have seemed to be better addressed by emotion than reason. Campbell’s religious activities offer what may be described as a mid-level explanation that complements this broader explanation. Campbell’s religious concerns were inextricably linked with concerns about social and political order. Third, this article complements research on the sources of his rhetorical theory. No doubt a number of thinkers and circumstances shaped, are reflected in, and are consistent with Campbell’s theory of rhetoric. David Hume’s theory of human nature as well as his attack on miracles are probably the most significant of these influences. Given Campbell’s vocation and publications, his religious purposes ought not to be discounted. Thus this study highlights the need to study theories of rhetoric in the contexts of an author’s “other” works and practical concerns.

I first detail Campbell’s arguments for a moderate preaching style and for a view of the Gospels as undesigned testimony—as reports of matters of fact—that reveal God’s truths. I then argue that these positions shape Campbell’s conception of emotional appeals as inventible and intimately connected with appeals to reason, as well as his assumptions that passion and reason are universal, passive faculties of mind.

**Campbell’s Religious Purposes and Emotional Appeals**

Because my argument assumes that Campbell was mindful of practical implications of his theory of rhetoric, I begin with two theoretical positions on the nature and status of emotional appeals that Campbell could have advocated but did not: use emotional appeals only or use appeals to reason only. Of course these positions could be and have been advocated by other thinkers addressing not only religious but
other kinds of circumstances. And they are extremes more easily separated analytically than in practice. But they are always a live way to address the issue of whether rhetors ought to use emotional appeals. A theorist’s arguments for or against these positions offer insight into the theorist’s take on what the rhetorical forms and functions of emotional appeals ought to be in a given situation and why.

First, Campbell could have advocated a theory of rhetoric holding that emotional appeals only or primarily should be used since reason is weak. Campbell apparently had reservations about the strength of the reasoning faculty in most members of a congregation. In his lectures on pulpit eloquence Campbell suggests that “the inferior ranks of people” are “the bulk of his audience” (372), that “the bulk of the people are unused to reading and study” (376), and that “the generality of hearers are very little capable” of too intense an application of thought (433). Likewise, in “An Address to the People of Scotland” he asserts that “[t]he bulk of mankind are more influenced by their passions, in forming their opinions, than by reason” (314). In his sermon on the spirit of the Gospel, in a moment of conciliatory language toward doctrinal opponents, Campbell asserts that “[t]he understanding is too generally the dupe of the passions; and we are easily brought to believe what would gratify a predominant inclination” (392). And in the sermon “The Happy Influence of Religion on Civil Society” he asserts: “Let it not be pretended, that there is no danger from the reasonings of the sceptic, because these are far above the comprehension of vulgar understandings. For those men will fondly adopt the conclusion who are incapable of apprehending aught of the premisses. The authority of great names among the learned will ever be to them a sufficient foundation” (111).

Second, Campbell could have advocated a theory of rhetoric holding that appeals to reason only or primarily should be used because emotional appeals warp judgment. In both Philosophy of Rhetoric and “Lectures on Pulpit Eloquence,” Campbell asserts that passion disturbs “the operation of the intellectual faculty” (Philosophy 2; “Pulpit” 401). In addition, for Campbell introducing knowledge before emotion is more natural so presumably more effective: “the progression from knowledge to faith, from faith to love, from love to obedience, is more conformable to the natural influence of things upon the human mind” (Systematic 170–1). There would be good precedent for preachers to focus on appeals to reason since “[t]he Lord Jesus Christ, the author of our religion, often argued, both with his disciples and with his adversaries, as with reasonable men, on the principles of reason. Without this faculty, he well knew, they could not be susceptible either of religion or of law” (Dissertation 1: 27). Moreover, for Campbell emotional appeals
alone may be a verbal equivalent of force, and he wants belief to be properly earned; as he says in his lectures on ecclesiastical history: "By convincing your judgment, it shall powerfully operate upon your will, and make your duty to become your choice" (182).

Campbell’s theory of mind helps to explain why he can abandon neither reason nor passion. He cannot abandon reason given his view of the faculty as a fundamental ability to classify sense perceptions—one that humans share with animals even though humans are superior to animals, and some humans are superior to other humans (Philosophy 48). He cannot abandon passion given his view that passion is the mover to action (Philosophy 78; “Pulpit” 463–64). But if Campbell designs a rhetorical theory with the needs of preachers in mind, then we may ask what practical circumstances motivated his theoretical choices.

A prima facie case for the importance of religion in Campbell’s theorizing about rhetoric may be made by considering his publications and vocation. Besides Philosophy of Rhetoric, almost all of Campbell’s published work is religious.10 In his own time he was best known for his A Dissertation on Miracles (1762). His most ambitious scholarly project was The Four Gospels (1789), a translation of the Gospels with a lengthy introduction and copious notes. He also published a number of sermons. In 1741 he attended divinity lectures in Edinburgh and later was a theology student under professors at King’s and Marischal Colleges in Aberdeen. Campbell, with other students, organized the theological club; one of Campbell’s contemporaries described Campbell as “the life and soul of the society” (Keith ix). Campbell received his license to preach in 1746. He served as Principal and Professor of Divinity of Marischal College. He regularly lectured and preached until close to the time of his death in 1796. His Lectures on Ecclesiastical History, Lectures on Systematic Theology and Pulpit Eloquence, and Lectures on the Pastoral Character were published after his death. Campbell’s occupation and preoccupations are good reasons for believing that the view of rhetoric he advocates in Philosophy of Rhetoric is shaped in part by religious concerns. Campbell wants to advocate a moderate preaching style and defend the authority of revealed religion.

Campbell as Teacher of Preachers

Purpose and audience help to account for a thinker’s positions on whether preachers ought to use emotional appeals and, if so, what emotions ought to be evoked or invoked, and how. Is the aim to advocate particular doctrines, to move a congregation to do what they already know should be done, to convert non-religious persons,
persons of a related faith, persons of a radically different faith? Does the preacher aim to distinguish herself and members of her congregation from competitors and, if so, what kinds of emotional performances may be a mark of distinction? Since Campbell was Professor of Divinity at Marischal College in Aberdeen, he was directly involved in training future ministers in the Church of Scotland. Among the topics he lectured on as part of a broader program of training ministers was preaching, or pulpit eloquence. He includes advice on preaching in lectures on other topics and in sermons delivered to fellow ministers. These sources provide insight into his religious purposes.

Like other Moderates in the Kirk, Campbell was concerned about the so-called Popular party within the Church of Scotland, other Protestant evangelicals such as John Wesley, and Jacobite challenges. Briefly, anti-Moderates tended to use a more emotional, less polished preaching style due in part to a different conception of purpose—not edification so much as conversion and salvation. Likewise, Protestant evangelicals such as George Whitefield used a more emotional preaching style. These forces, coupled with Catholic strongholds in the highlands and islands and the 1745 Jacobite Rebellion, contributed to Moderate fears of challenges to the religious and political status quo. Upon these circumstances are based Campbell's views of, first, the needs of congregations and, second, the conduct of preachers.

Although Campbell describes preaching as “the great means of conversion as well as of edification” (“Pulpit” 354), his advice focuses less on converting than edifying or, as he puts it, “the reformation of mankind” (“Pulpit” 377). Lukewarmness does not accomplish this; in the course of defending the study of eloquence against the charge that it is dangerous, Campbell mentions a preacher he knew who was “long the aversion of the populace, on account of his dulness, awkwardness, and coldness” (Philosophy 11). Nor does enthusiasm; Campbell notes that “there is no pitch of brutality and rapacity to which the passions of avarice and ambition, consecrated and inflamed by religious enthusiasm, will not drive mankind,” and remarks that “even in our own time, have we not seen new factions raised by popular declaimers, whose only merit was impudence, whose only engine of influence was calumny and self-praise, whose only moral lesson was malevolence” (Philosophy 109).

Instead Campbell recommends what may be described as a warm, gentle kind of persuasion. Describing how style ought to be “affecting,” Campbell observes: “It is indeed that warmth, and gentle emotion in the address and language, which serves to show, that the speaker is much in earnest in what he says, and is actuated to say it from the tenderest concern for the welfare of his hearers” (“Pulpit” 376; see also
378). Again, discussing the “pathetic” sermon, Campbell recommends that “the pathos excited by the preacher, ought ever to be accompanied with, and chastened by, piety, submission and charity. At the same time, that it conveys both light and heat to the soul, it is pure and inoffensive; like that wherein God appeared to Moses in the bush which burned, but was not consumed” (“Pulpit” 394). Or, to take a final example, Campbell says that in a pathetic sermon “for disposing a congregation to a suitable commemoration of the sufferings of our Lord, in the sacrament of the supper, or Eucharist” the aim

is to operate on all the grateful and devout affections of the heart, and to put his hearers, I may say, in a proper frame of spirit for discharging the duty for which they are assembled, in such a reverend and pious manner, as may produce the best effect upon their minds, and tend most to the edification and confirmation of themselves and others. (“Pulpit” 460–61)

As Walzer has aptly noted about this passage: “This is not a description of an effect that we ordinarily associate with passionate rhetoric” (Campbell 120).

Even in cases where a rhetor arouses a stronger emotion like fear, it must be reasonable. As Campbell puts it when he distinguishes between the fear of the superstitious and the fear of the religious:

There is a fear that is reasonable and proper; there is a fear that is unreasonable and weak. [ ... W]e even read it in our frame, that all the inferior powers of the soul should be informed by reason, and controled by conscience. The evil then only takes place, when the passion, emancipating itself, and disdaining all restraint and control, is directed towards an improper object, or cherished in an undue degree. (“Spirit” 321–22)

Campbell’s account of an appropriate preaching style based on the needs of the congregation indicates that for Campbell emotional appeals ought to be tempered in some way, whether by the kind of emotion appealed to or by reason. Moreover, Campbell places a higher premium on appeals to reason than appeals to emotion.

Campbell’s rhetorical theory is also shaped by his view of appropriate conduct for preachers. One of his contemporaries offers this account of Campbell’s aims in training students of divinity: “Upon the whole, Dr Campbell appears to have been a liberal-minded man in the proper sense of that word, it being his ambition to breed up a learned, accomplished, faithful clergy, who should steer equally clear of enthusiasm and lukewarmness” (Ramsay 1:490). Campbell
advocates a preaching style that distinguishes moderate preachers from both the superstitious and enthusiastic. About the latter he asserts:

To head a sect, to infuse party-spirit, to make men arrogant, uncharitable, and malevolent, is the easiest task imaginable, and to which almost any blockhead is fully equal. But to produce the contrary effect, to subdue the spirit of faction, and that monster spiritual pride, with which it is invariably accompanied, to inspire equity, moderation, and charity into men’s sentiments and conduct with regard to others, is the genuine test of eloquence. (Philosophy 110)

Campbell advises those who want to claim Christian morality to have a command of their passions (Systematic 175; Keith lxxv). He advises students of divinity to beware of overzealous passion in others and to preserve moderation in themselves. As he puts it in his lectures on systematic theology:

It is extremely difficult to preserve moderation, when one is opposed with bigotry; or evenness of temper, when one is encountered with fury. The love of victory is but too apt to supplant in our breasts the love of knowledge, and in the confusion, dust and smoke, raised by the combatants, both sides often lose sight of the truth. These considerations are not mentioned to deter any of you from this part of the study, but to excite all of you to come to it properly prepared, candid, circumspect, modest, attentive, and cool. (21)

In fact he recommends that students not pay much attention to matters of controversy since these disrupt the temper of moderation: attending to controversy is

a method which would tend only to form a habit of turning every thing into matter of wrangling and logomachy, those noxious weeds, those briars and thorns with which almost all the walks of theology have been so unhappily pestered. In my judgment, a habit of this kind greatly hurts the rational powers, when in appearance it only exercises them; it doth worse, it often greatly injures an ingenuous and candid temper; it infects one with a rage of disputation, the cacoethes of pedants; it inclines the mind to hunt more for the specious than the solid, and in the ardour of the combat to sacrifice truth to victory. (Systematic 95–6; see also 194).

Campbell understands his featuring of more reasonable, gentler emotions as a way for moderate preachers not only to distinguish themselves from competitors but, significantly, to achieve and
maintain peace and union more generally. Consider how Campbell contrasts Christian zeal with the zeal of sects:

There is in it an ardour for the truth, not that men may be either allured or terrified into a verbal profession of what they do not in their hearts believe, (the grossest insult that can be offered to truth), but that they may attain a rational conviction. The interests of truth itself it desires to promote for a still further end; that by means of it, love may be kindled both to God and man: that by means of it, temperance, and justice, and piety, and peace, may flourish on the earth. (“Spirit” 402)

He continues the description:

Candid in judging, and warmed with kindness, she [zeal] always aims at union, assiduously promoting peace. She understands the import of moderation and mutual forbearance, and can cordially receive as brethren persons who differ in some sentiments; avoiding matters of doubtful dispute, and whatever a cause of stumbling might prove to the weak. (“Spirit” 406–7)

Campbell asserts that the enthusiast is characterized “by the extravagancies of a heated brain” (“Spirit” 338) and describes the harmful consequences: “Weak judgment and ungovernable passions may give rise to those differences that breed division; but when sects are once formed, political causes co-operate in producing that malignity which they so commonly bear to one another” (“Spirit” 425)

It may not be overstating the case to say that for Campbell the cure to religious and concomitant kinds of disorder is an ordered mind. In his sermon on the spirit of the Gospel Campbell analyzes the character of true religion into the spirit of power, of love, and of a sound mind. Significantly, he chooses to focus on a sound mind because “it has been less attended to, and [...] this inattention has been the source even of those evils which have affected the other parts of the character” (341). According to Campbell neither the superstitious nor enthusiastic has “a sound mind” ( “Spirit” 338). Campbell defines a sound mind as follows:

A sound mind is here opposed to a frantic or disordered imagination, wherein the light of reason is obscured, if not extinguished, by the terrors of superstition, or the arrogance of fanaticism. Nor is there any lineament whereby True Religion may be more perfectly distinguished from every pretender which falsely assumes her name, than this good sense, or soundness of mind, that gives the finishing to her character. (“Spirit” 341–42)
Campbell’s call for order in the mind and his concern that enthusiasm disrupts this order is a counterpart to the moderate fear that evangelism would revive fanaticism and disorder; his preoccupation with preaching may be explained in part by a desire to regenerate morality to maintain national order (Sher 31–2, 44). Again, we see that Campbell puts a premium upon reason in preaching.

Campbell as Defender of Revealed Religion

Emotional appeals may intersect with the interpretation of sacred texts in ways such as the following. If a rhetorician considers the spiritual to be more a matter of feeling than doctrine, then sacred texts may be ignored, or treatments of sacred texts may focus less on interpretation or focus interpretation on the religious emotions solicited. If a rhetorician puts a premium on reason as Campbell does, then issues involving interpretation may include: are multiple interpretations acceptable; if so, how do we generate them; if not, how do we decide which is true? If not just the interpretation but the nature and authenticity of sacred texts are at issue, then their reason and emotionality may be marshaled as evidence for or against a given position. Are sacred texts best understood as testimonial evidence about matters of fact or as persuasive documents? Moreover, sacred texts may be interpreted in a way that aims to cultivate particular kinds of emotional displays.

Campbell’s purpose of defending the authority of revealed religion helps to shape his view of emotional appeals and his assumptions about reason and emotion. First, Campbell wants to maintain a need for scripture—to argue that religious truths exist in the Bible and not just in the “book of Nature,” for example (Lectures 357). Early in the eighteenth century Deists challenged the authority of revealed religion. Theological debates of the preceding age—debates that had resulted in persecution and violence—had led them to believe that it would be wise “to substitute reason and nature for dogmas and creeds [. . . .] The unseemly and inconclusive wrangles about the meaning of Scripture had discredited the Bible as a court of appeal” (Cragg 65). Deists questioned whether the Bible was the word of God revealed directly to humans; if everything coming from God is perfect, then why is the style of the Gospel writers so rude, barbarous, and faulty? One historian has described this issue as “the heart of the matter” and discussions of it as “that mountain of literature (now largely obsolete) in which a few challenged, and many defended, the authenticity, consistency, and inherent probability of the Bible as the direct word of God” (Stromberg 62).
That Campbell continued to worry about deists even at this late date is apparent from his lectures on systematic theology. In Lecture V Campbell says that students do not need to worry much about controversy, but he does recommend attention to some, the first of which is deistic controversies. In the preface to *The Four Gospels*, Campbell objects to the claim that through reason alone it is possible to discover truths of consequence to humans:

> The fact is nearly the reverse: for except those things which pass within our own minds, and which we learn solely from what is called consciousness, and except the deductions made from self-evident or mathematical axioms, all our information relating to fact, or existence of any kind, is from without. [...] Reason is the eye of the mind: it is in consequence of our possessing it, that we are susceptible either of religion or of law. Now the light by which the mental eye is informed, comes also from without, and consists chiefly in testimony, human or divine. (*Four* iii)

As he asks in “The Spirit of the Gospel,” “Will the bright doctrines of revelation be found to have any coincidence with the discoveries we can make by the twilight of our natural faculties” (342). He holds that reason is not the standard of truth; instead, “it is, primarily, no more than the test or the touchstone of evidence, and, in a secondary sense only, the standard of truth” (*Four* ii). Campbell considers the truths revealed in scripture to be evidence or matters of fact and in matters of fact, he argues, “the proper province of [reason], lies in comparing and judging the proofs brought before it, not in supplying from invention any deficiency in these” (*Four* 237; see also 238, 264, *Philosophy* 62–3).

This points to a second purpose: Campbell wants to constrain interpretations of scripture. The mistaken belief that reason can generate truths has, for Campbell, led people to look to the Bible to confirm their beliefs—or, put differently, to invent arguments to support false doctrine—rather than to simply see the truths revealed there:

> Each would exercise his ingenuity in giving such a turn to the dictates of revelation as would make them appear conformable to his favourite opinions, and would conciliate both, where they appeared to clash. When the rein is once given to Fancy, she is not easily curbed even in her wildest excursions. Subtle and inventive heads would be daily publishing their own visions as the oracles of God. (“Spirit” 356)

Put simply, “It is not every specious deduction by inference from Scripture, that ought to be put on the same footing with those doctrines which are clearly revealed there” (“Spirit” 409). Because this kind of thinking can lead to different parties or sects, because Campbell wants
to promote unity, and although he continues to put a premium upon reason, Campbell chooses to view reason as a relatively weak, limited, and passive faculty.

Third, because Campbell wants to consider the truths revealed through scripture to be matters of fact, he wants to classify the Gospels as testimonial evidence (Philosophy 56)—not as attempts to persuade readers. By conceiving of the Gospels as evidence, Campbell again aims to constrain interpretations. The Gospel writers do not make arguments that may be interpreted in multiple ways or hold multiple meanings. Instead, they simply testify to matters of fact. Campbell therefore needs to argue that there is an absence of persuasive design. For Campbell this means that absent must be arguments and emotional appeals. Commenting on the Gospel of Luke, Campbell asserts: “A simple narration of the facts is given; but no attempt is made, by argument, asservation, or animated expression, to bias the understanding, or work upon the passions. The naked truth is left to its own native evidence. The writers betray no suspicion of its insufficiency” (Four 98; see also 31). Regarding the Gospel writers’ style of reporting miracles Campbell observes: “In one uniform strain they record the most signal miracles, and the most ordinary events. [...] Equally certain of the facts advanced, they recite both in the same unvaried tone, as faithful witnesses, whose business it was to testify, and not to argue” (Four 34). According to Campbell the Gospel narratives exclude “that quality of style which is called animation” (Four 34)—one of the sources of emotional appeals that he identifies in Philosophy of Rhetoric (215). In addition, he asserts: “The historian invariably preserves the same equable tenor, never betraying the smallest degree of warmth against any person, or attempting to prepossess the minds, or work upon the passions, of his readers” (Four 45). Because even “the smallest degree of warmth against any person” is not apparent, the principle of sympathy is not involved—another source of emotional appeals that he identifies in Philosophy of Rhetoric (131). And he suggests that even though the facts may arouse emotion, they are not designed to:

In displaying the most gracious, as well as marvellous, dispensation of Providence towards man, all is directed to mend his heart, nothing to move his pity, or kindle his resentment. If these effects be also produced, they are manifestly the consequences of the naked exposition of the facts, and not of any adventitious art in the writers, nay not of any one term, not otherwise necessary, employed for the purpose. (Four 35)

Apparent absence of persuasive design not only helps Campbell to classify the Gospels as evidence but also enables him to highlight
the credibility of the Gospel writers. Campbell holds that the Gospels lack the human art of rhetoric in order “that the excellency of the power, to the conviction of every impartial spectator, might be of God, and not of man” (“Success” 66).\footnote{Campbell asserts about the Gospel writers that “what has hitherto been found invariably to mark the character of fanatics and enthusiasts of all religions, we do not discover in them a single trace. Their narratives demonstrate them to have been men of sound minds and cool reflection” (Four 36; see also 275). Thus Campbell aims to cultivate this kind of disposition in readers.}

**Campbell on Emotional Appeals in *Philosophy of Rhetoric***

Campbell's aims to train future ministers and to defend the authority of revealed religion intersect with and shape his treatment of emotional appeals in *Philosophy of Rhetoric*. Since these aims involve treating emotion as something that ought to be tempered either by appealing to gentle emotions or to reason, Campbell conceives of emotional appeals as practically inseparable from reason. Because these aims also involve constraining interpretations of scripture, Campbell conceives of both reason and passion as relatively passive faculties.

Campbell’s conception of emotional appeals may be analyzed into the invention and presentation of emotional appeals. This division is compatible not only with the traditional canons of rhetoric but also with how Campbell describes the orator’s art: unlike architects who can design but not execute their own plans, “it is equally incumbent on the orator to design and execute” (*Philosophy* 170). The following explication of Campbell’s conception of emotional appeals in *Philosophy of Rhetoric* highlights three main points. First, both reason and emotion are relatively passive faculties—an appealing theoretical position given Campbell’s desire to constrain scriptural interpretations. Second, emotional appeals are inventible or designed—not unrehearsed or spontaneous externalizations of internal states that may promote disorder. This position helps rhetors design emotional appeals tempered by reason since their design involves marshalling evidence. It also helps rhetors to distinguish themselves from those who put a premium on emotional displays. Further, it helps to bolster the authority of revealed religion; God speaks to humans through the Bible rather than through the enthusiastic, spontaneous ravings of an unsound mind. Third, both the invention and presentation of emotional appeals are practically inseparable from reason. Thus rhetors may avoid the extremes of lukewarmness and enthusiasm, and work to maintain religious, social, and political order.
Campbell holds that reason and emotion are universal faculties of mind and that their operations are similar in fundamental ways. Campbell holds that appeals to both faculties are not relative to time, culture, and so on; he speculates that we may discover that people around the globe both argue and feel in much the same way (34; see also 37). In addition, both reason and passion operate by principles of association (129). Moreover, both are passive. Passions are operated upon, and for Campbell reason is a relatively passive, mechanical faculty that automatically compares and classifies sense data, sometimes without individuals even being aware of the process. We are more likely to call our mind’s motion “reasoning” when we are conscious of its motion (48–49). These assumptions assist Campbell’s purpose of constraining interpretations of scripture. If reason is a passive faculty that operates naturally and predictably in response to sense data, then it ought not be used to generate multiple interpretations but to simply illuminate what is. And if the operations of reason and passion are universal, then multiple acceptable interpretations over time or across cultures or among sects are not possible.

Despite the passive nature of reason and passion, Campbell holds that emotional appeals may be invented. In *Philosophy of Rhetoric* Campbell presents what may be described as a topical invention system for emotional appeals in his list of “circumstances that are chiefly instrumental in operating on the Passions” (81). The circumstances are probability, plausibility, importance, proximity of time, connection of place, relation to the persons concerned, and interest in the consequences. The more probable, plausible, important, and so on the circumstance, the more it excites passion. This is a system of topical invention in the sense of “loci” or places where arguments are stored analogous to ciceronian systems of invention. As one could run through the loci for, say, a person’s circumstances to develop a prosecution or defense case—birth, friendships, children, relations, connections, resources, and so on—one may run through the seven circumstances to invent emotional appeals. The seven circumstances do not work as topics in the Aristotelian sense of statements of probability and, as Walzer has put it, they do not “serve as premises in apodictic proof” (“Campbell” 82; *Campbell* 81). But viewed as “places” they do work like a place system of invention used to invent emotional appeals based in probability and inseparable from reason.

Their inseparability from reason may be illustrated by recalling that to use a “place” system of topical invention, it is essential to have facts to “fill” the places. For Campbell the facts include the different kinds of evidence discussed in Chapter V of Book I (experience, analogy, testimony, and calculation of chances). In his discussion of
the seven circumstances, Campbell notes ways that different kinds of evidence may be used with respect to different topics. For example, probability results from evidence (81), experience or testimony may need to be supplied in cases where plausibility is improbable (82, 84, 87), and so on. The orator may run through the places and “select those circumstances that are favourable to his own plea, or which excite the passion that is directly instrumental in promoting his end” (275). Significantly, then, for Campbell emotional appeals are inventible—they may be designed.16

Their inseparability from reason may be even more apparent when we recall that Campbell refers to his chapter on evidence as being designed to accomplish the second step of persuasion—appeal to reason (274–75). And Campbell remarks at the end of the section on the seven circumstances that “pleading the importance and the other pathetic circumstances, or pleading the authority of opinions or precedents [to excite auxiliary passions], is usually considered, and aptly enough, as being likewise a species of reasoning” (92). So intertwined are reason and emotion in Campbell’s account of emotional appeals that speakers cannot achieve persuasion if they attain “the pathetic without the rational” or “the rational without the pathetic” (78). In fact, vehemence—“the supreme qualification of the orator” (4)—results when the argumentative and the pathetic are interwoven. Thus for Campbell emotional appeals ought to be tempered by reason—a product of conscious reflection rather than a spontaneous outburst, a crafting of public character rather than an externalization of an internal state.

The tie of emotional appeals to reason is also apparent from Campbell’s discussion of the presentation of emotional appeals. Campbell recommends three main ways of presenting emotional appeals. First, rhetors can use descriptive language to call to auditors’ minds sense data that cause an emotional response. In Campbell’s view it would be best if orators could bring auditors to directly witness the circumstances because he holds that “[a] passion is most strongly excited by sensation” (81). The next best case would be to help them recall circumstances they had witnessed because he holds that, after sensations, ideas of memory most strongly excite passion. In lieu of these, an orator must make due with using language to help auditors imagine the circumstances or, as Campbell puts it, to “make the ideas he summons up in the imaginations of his hearers, resemble, in lustre and steadiness, those of sensation and remembrance” (81) and to “make every aggravating circumstance be, as it were, both perceived and felt by them” (92).

Although this account suggests that for Campbell circumstances themselves naturally excite passion, it is noteworthy that he describes the presentational design of such an appeal in terms of an enthymeme:
In the enthymeme, (the syllogism of orators, as Quintilian terms it,) employed in such cases, the sentiment that such a quality or circumstance ought to rouse such a passion, though the foundation of all, is generally assumed without proof, or even without mention. This forms the major proposition, which is suppressed as obvious. His whole art is exerted in evincing the minor, which is the antecedent in his argument, and which maintains the reality of those attendant circumstances in the case in hand. (92).

In short, the major proposition is: If these circumstances exist, then you ought to feel this passion; the minor proposition affirms the antecedent: These circumstances exist; and the conclusion is: You ought to feel this passion. The major premise, according to Campbell, “we must learn originally from feeling, not from argument” (92), a position Campbell explicitly links to divine design in his lectures on systematic theology:

> God hath not left the discovery of practical truths, or what regards our duty, in the same way, as those truths that are of a theoretic nature, to the slow and precarious deductions of the rational faculty; but has in our consciences given such clear intimations of what is right and amiable in conduct, that where there have been no prejudices to occupy the mind, and pervert the natural sense of things, it commands an immediate and instinctive approbation. (181–82)\(^\text{17}\)

Although for Campbell the major premise is not founded in reason, the appeal as a whole is designed and presented with a particular version of reasoning in mind.

In addition to descriptive language, emotional appeals may also be designed in a way that takes advantage of the principle of sympathy which, for Campbell, is a quality of the soul or principle of communication by means of which passions are communicated from orator to auditor (131, 15).\(^\text{18}\) As he puts it: “It is by sympathy that we rejoice with them that rejoice, and weep with them that weep” (131); sympathy is “a reflected feeling” (89). Orators can design appeals that make use of the principle of sympathy by using figures that serve as external signs of internal states. According to Campbell, exclamation, apostrophe, and interrogation, for example, enliven ideas through the principle of sympathy (94). Although for Campbell emotional appeals based on this principle do not involve reasoning, this principle, like all of his explanatory principles, is inventional.\(^\text{19}\)

Third, emotional appeals may be comprised of figures to animate the mind. Campbell advises the orator who “purposes to work upon the passions [that] his very diction, as well as his sentiments, must
be animated” (215). Correction, climax, and vision, he explains, “tend greatly to enliven the ideas, by the implicit, but animated comparison and opposition conveyed in them. Implicit and indirect comparison is more suitable to the disturbed state of mind required by the pathetic, than that which is explicit and direct. The latter implies leisure and tranquility, the former rapidity and fire” (94). These figures are “adapted to the pathetic,” and the mind’s action at least in these cases is comparing—the key action involved in Campbell’s conception of reasoning (48–49).

In short, Campbell’s religious concerns help to explain why in Philosophy of Rhetoric he conceives of reason and passion as universal, passive faculties; and why his account of presenting and inventing emotional appeals puts a premium upon reason and its inseparability from passion.

**Conclusions**

Campbell’s account of the invention and presentation of emotional appeals in Philosophy of Rhetoric is shaped by the purposes of advocating a moderate style of preaching and of defending the authority of revealed religion. The seven circumstances in Philosophy of Rhetoric may be understood as a “place” system of invention that works like ancient ciceronian systems but modifies the places themselves. Campbell needed to alter classical models in part because the classical models were not designed for religious occasions. As he tells students in his lectures on pulpit eloquence, “my intention [… is] to assist you in applying [ancient critics’ and orators’] rules and examples to cases so different from those with which alone they were concerned” (454). Certainly Campbell would also want to alter classical models in order to keep pace with the intellectual currents of the new philosophy. But as this study shows, Campbell’s orientation toward inventing emotional appeals is different from that of classical models due in part to different kinds of purposes. Campbell does not offer an inventional system oriented toward the classical ideal of copious eloquence as a way of managing uncertainty. Instead, as we have seen, Campbell wants to constrain possible interpretations in the interest of maintaining order. Conceiving of reason and passion as relatively passive limits what rhetors can see and say. Conceiving of reason and passion as inseparable and moderate limits the possibilities for advocating change. It also enables Campbell and like-minded preachers and auditors to distinguish themselves from competitors and identify with each other through emotional performances. These implications coincide with Campbell’s practical purposes. If social and political disorder
are understood to be caused by disordered minds, then it seems appropriate to adapt classical systems of invention to a theory of rhetoric grounded in using language to affect faculties of mind.

This study suggests that the place of emotional appeals in theories of rhetoric ought to be considered not only in philosophical or broad cultural contexts but also in the context of the theorist’s work as a whole and, at least in cases where a theorist has clear ties to a religious organization or movement, in a religious context. It suggests the need to consider a theorist’s practical purposes and audiences, perhaps as a preacher preaching to the choir, converting so-called heathens or members of a related denomination, or reawakening religious fervor in one’s own; or perhaps as a theologian generating or constraining scriptural interpretations. And it has aimed to enhance our understanding of Campbell’s theory of rhetoric, of the potential nature and status of emotional appeals in theories of rhetoric and of their potential intersections with religion; and reaffirmed some basic guidelines for studying the history of rhetorical traditions.

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Notes

1Gross has recently made a similar point about emotions, arguing for an understanding of emotions as social and rhetorical rather than individual and psychological. Clark has discussed how landscapes can assert a religious identity and perform rhetorical functions in a secular national culture.

2I do not focus on his conception of passions as such; Walzer has discussed it in “Campbell” and Campbell, ch. 6.

3For example Shuger has detailed the relationship between reason and passion in Renaissance sacred rhetorics, and Kastely has discussed the status of emotion in rhetorical traditions more broadly.

4According to Corrigan, some scholars in religious studies have posited that emotion is the “essential, irreducible component of religion, one that cannot be analyzed into its parts, parsed, as it were, into nonreligious artifacts” (5).

5The most recent discussions of the issue hold that Campbell offers a theory of reception (Walzer, Campbell 103) or management of the discursive communication of mental impressions (Miller 219) rather than a theory of invention or production. Similarly, others have described Campbell’s view of invention as an “attenuation” of traditional classical inventional systems (Bevilacqua, “Campbell” 94, “Philosophical” 5, 7); “as much a spirit and point of view as […] any specific body of rules and precepts” (Ehninger, “Old Friends” 267, “Revisited” 176); and as “based on association psychology” (Crowley 12; see also 15–16). Scholars have variously described the inventional problem that Campbell addressed as “how previously derived arguments and appeals
might most effectively be employed in influencing those particular persons toward whom the discourse was directed” (Ehninger, “Revolution” 273) and “discovering the means of enlivening ideas” (Bitzer, “Hume’s” 158). More recently scholars have argued that Campbell replaced traditional inventional systems with a “preoccupation with the Sublime, beauty, novelty, propriety, and the like” (Warnick 11) and a conception of eloquence “as a fulcrum that enables us to balance thought and language in order to achieve the ends of discourse” (Ulman 107).

Walzer has asserted that Campbell’s “assumption that reason cannot establish a hierarchy of values […] responds to the historical conditions of [the] eighteenth century when an emerging democracy made societal agreements problematic as wider participation brought to the surface differences in basic values that seemed irreconcilable by reasoned argument” (“Campbell” 84). Miller (206–07) has made a similar point.

This may be the most fully developed area of Campbell scholarship. Scholars have argued that Campbell’s sources include Bacon, Hume, Reid, and Scottish Common Sense philosophy more generally (see for example Benoit; Bevilacqua, “Philosophical”; Bitzer, “Hume’s”; Bormann; Mohrmann; Edney; Miller 154–55).

A similar point has been made by Walzer, Campbell 5; Suderman 5, 249; and Conley 217, 219. Suderman has suggested that Campbell’s rhetoric may have shaped his religious principles when he describes the relationship between The Four Gospels and Philosophy of Rhetoric: “The translation of the four canonical Gospels was a practical working out of the philosophical and rhetorical principles found in The Philosophy of Rhetoric” (147). Certainly it is not implausible that Campbell’s rhetoric shaped his thinking about religious issues and circumstances. In this article, however, I focus on his rhetorical theory as a way of addressing a rhetorical situation because, based on the argument to follow, I think in this case it is the primary direction of influence.

The apparent tension between this position and his analysis of persuasion—first appeal to passion and then judgment (Philosophy 77–78)—may be resolved by the account of the inseparability of reason and passion in inventing and presenting emotional appeals as described later in the discussion of Campbell on emotional appeals.

An exception is the anonymous Defence of the conduct of Marischal College, in relation to the present scheme of union, against the attack made on it by the Principal and six professors of King’s College. In a letter to a friend. By a member of Marischal College, which Fieser notes has been ascribed to Campbell (47; see also Suderman 25). The biographical information that follows comes from Keith and Suderman chs. 1–3; Bitzer, “Introduction” viii–xviii and Walzer, Campbell, ch. 1 also provide biographical information. For a brief overview of his life and work by one of his contemporaries, see Ramsay 1: 482–501.

Sher has described Aberdeen as a “Moderate stronghold” and Campbell as a clergyman-academic with Moderate inclinations (126). The following discussion is based on Matheson (ch. 4) who has detailed Evangelical and Moderate preaching styles using the writings of Campbell’s contemporaries; Drummond and Bulloch (chs. 3–5) who discuss Evangelicals and Moderates more generally; Sher who focuses on Moderates in Edinburgh; Fawcett who has discussed the beginnings of Evangelism in Scotland; and McIntosh who has discussed the theology of the Popular party. Brown 17–31 has briefly overviewed Presbyterian dissent during the eighteenth century.

A distrust of religious enthusiasm characterized the moderate literati more generally (Sher 8). Cragg has described enthusiasm as “the bête noire of the age” (30).

Gellis (132–34) and Walzer (Campbell 115–16) have noted correspondences between Campbell’s discussion of the syllogism, how he argues, and how he criticizes how others argue on religious issues.
Accounts of the kinds and strength of evidence available to rhetors may address the need to defend religious texts as evidence or to defend the evidence presented by religious texts. Miracle arguments, for example, depend on reasoning from experience and testimony: are those who testify to witnessing miracles credible, are events contrary to experience provable by testimony? Bitzer (“Indian”) details the miracle arguments of Campbell, Hume, and others; he and others have noted correspondences between Campbell’s theory of evidence and his religious purposes (Bitzer, “Introduction” xlviii, “Religious” 9–10; Suderman 249; Walzer, Campbell 114–15).

The need to distinguish between human rhetoric and the word of God helps to account for Campbell’s hard and fast distinction between thought and language in Philosophy of Rhetoric; it enables him to claim that his translation of the Gospels changes only the language of revelation—not its substance (Manolescu, “Campbell’s” 112).

Compare Howell who argues that instead of traditional topical invention Campbell “stressed […] that rhetorical subject matter must come from intellection, consciousness, common sense, experience, analogy, and testimony” (602); Bitzer who argues that Campbell assigned to invention “the essentially empirical mission of accurately drawing knowledge from observation and experience” (“Introduction” xxix); and Walzer who argues that Campbell offers “seven ways to increase a passion in lieu of a topical theory of invention” (“Campbell” 84).

As Bitzer has observed, Campbell’s religious commitments explain why in Philosophy of Rhetoric Campbell “never speaks of reasoning that establishes an ought or any moral term whatever” (“Religious” 13).

Sympathy in Campbell has been discussed at more length by Bator and Walzer, Campbell 84–88.

Campbell observes that discovering principles of human nature that explain rhetorical precepts will aid invention or, as he puts it, “a more thorough investigation of the latent energies […] whereby the instruments employed by eloquence produce their effect upon the hearers” will “enrich the fancy” such that “the proper mediums are suggested, whereby the necessary aids of topics, arguments, illustrations, and motives may be procured” (Philosophy lxxiv).

Howell has noted “Campbell’s strong sympathy for the new rhetoric, and for the new logic as well” (610) in Campbell’s lectures on pulpit eloquence.

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