Subnational Foreign Policy Actors: How and Why Governors Participate in U.S. Foreign Policy

SAMUEL LUCAS McMILLAN
University of South Carolina

U.S. governors lead overseas missions seeking investment and promoting trade, establish international offices, meet with heads of government, receive ambassadors, and take positions on foreign policy. This paper describes how governors are involved in participating in U.S. foreign policy, explains why governors seek to voice their views and play an active role in working with leaders and issues beyond their state’s borders, and argues that U.S. states and governors need to be better conceptualized and considered in both international relations theory and foreign policy analysis. This study reveals that governors with greater institutional powers—such as appointment and budgetary control—as well as personal powers—derived from their electoral mandate, ambition, and public approval—are more likely to have higher degrees of foreign policy activity. These actions are more likely to take place during wartime and also from governors representing U.S. states bordering Canada or Mexico.
This paper describes how governors are involved in participating in American foreign policy and foreign relations and attempts to explain why governors seek to voice their views and play an active role in working with foreign leaders and issues beyond their state’s borders by drawing upon the literature of international relations (IR), international political economy (IPE), federalism, and foreign policy analysis. Kline (1996:343) says scholars need to devise ways in which to look at both the institutional mechanisms of the “flexible strength” of American federalism as well as those institutions and powers aiding U.S. governors in international affairs. The “motivations, strategies, and methods of state and local involvement in transgovernmental and transnational interactions” must also be understood with relation to the political and economic aspects of U.S. foreign policy. This study tests hypotheses to determine if governors’ foreign policy participation is best explained by their institutional capabilities, personal powers, search for political office, or their state’s economic interdependence.

U.S. states have taken positions on the Iraq war, human rights abuses in Myanmar, Indonesia, Sudan, and Nigeria, the conflict over Kashmir, and the use of Holocaust-era bank accounts. They have adopted the Kyoto Protocol’s regulations and signed agreements with national and subnational governments involving topics such as environmental issues, trade, tourism cooperation, university exchanges, and shared government databases (Fry 1998; Kline 1999; Howard 2004). Yet governors are not the only subnational officials to go beyond their borders. Subnational leaders from provinces and states in Asia, Europe, North and South America are internationally active (Fry 1998; Blase 2003; Whatley 2003; Blindenbacher and Pasma 2007). The extent to which subnational governments participate in foreign relations varies with the constitutional framework of the nation-state, partisan relationships between two levels of government, as well as variables such as geography, culture, and economics (Michelmann 2007). Therefore, this topic fits into the larger framework of reconsidering U.S. states’ (and other subnational governments’) international capabilities.

Writing before advent of globalization and the end of the Cold War, Rosenau’s (1990) framework of a turbulent, multcentric system encourages scholars to look at the complexity of many actors in world politics. Rosenau points out that there are few issues in world politics today in which one level of government is allocated all responsibility. The blurring of domestic and foreign issues means that citizens are affected by foreign policy choices and that foreign policy—traditionally controlled by the national government—is increasingly within the interests of U.S. states and governors. Continued advances in a globalized world, especially in communication and transportation, make it much easier for today’s governors to be involved in international issues (Michelmann 2007). Interdependencies also make it much more difficult for governors to ignore how their U.S. state may be affected by international events, whether from economic, environmental, political, or public health challenges. Thus, it is not just economic globalization that precipitates governors’ foreign policy participation (Beaumont 1996; Kline 1996; Fry 1998).

The U.S. Constitution’s mandate that the national government oversee external relations “appears to establish a nonpermeable internal political boundary” preventing U.S. states from dealing with foreign national and subnational governments (Kline 1996:330). Yet scholars such as Conlan (1998) have shown how New Federalism—which gave less federal aid to U.S. states and decentralized management of some issues—may have also enabled greater international activities of U.S. states and governors. This also resulted in intergovernmental connections, such as the institutions set up by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) like the State Point of Contact system and Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee (Conlan and Sager 2001; Sager 2002). In a world in which U.S. states react differently to multilateral trade agreements, treaties, and foreign policy problems of a political, economic, and defense context,
it is imperative for scholars to understand the foreign policy behavior of U.S. states and governors.

After a brief description of the changing roles of governors and U.S. states, this paper will explore IR theory to explain how the definition of transgovernmental actors needs to be expanded and how vertical dimensions of foreign policy analysis must be examined. This is connected with federalism literature and the use of institutional approaches from U.S. state politics to produce an analytical framework from which specific hypotheses are derived and then tested. The paper concludes with analysis, interpretation, and avenues for future research.

The Changing Roles of Governors

To fully understand how governors became involved in foreign policy, one must understand how the governorship has been transformed. A comparison of 1950s gubernatorial roles with those that “emerged during the 1960s” and later developed reveals three themes: (i) differences in the political environment in which governors function, (ii) appearance and growth of governors as a principal in federal-state relations, and (iii) the emergence of the governorship as a management position (Beyle and Muchmore 1983:17–18). Since the 1970s, another theme is governors' international roles, related to economic development and an expansion of governors' head of state duties.

The changing role of governors is illustrated in how governors are received by foreign dignitaries and increasingly meeting with heads of national governments. Some officials say governors are not usually allowed to meet national ministers and heads of government because countries know that governors are not representatives of U.S. policy and do not want to offend Washington (Personal Interviews with MO Overseas Official and U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service Overseas Official 2006). Yet, Colorado Gov. Bill Owens’ meetings with high-level U.K. officials included trade policy discussions (Sanko 2003) and many governors have met with presidents of Mexico. For example, governors from 10 of the 14 states examined in this study met with a president of Mexico between 1995 and 2004. Table 1 presents the countries whose officials met with the governors considered in this study.

Governors have adapted their institutional structures to reflect these changes and work with international issues. California Gov. Gray Davis created a secretary of foreign affairs in his office, an official who organized the first trip by a Mexican president to Sacramento and Davis' overseas meetings with “British, Israeli and Greek ministers, and Irish, Scottish and Palestinian leaders” (Lindlaw 1999). During his first year in office, Davis hosted leaders from China, Japan,

Table 1. Countries from which Sample Governors met National and Subnational Officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of official</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heads of State or Heads of Government</td>
<td>Canada, China, Cuba, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, European Union, Germany, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Mexico, Nicaragua, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, United Kingdom, Vatican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subnational officials (governors, provincial premiers, etc.)</td>
<td>Australia, Austria, Canada, China, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Russia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1 Although all U.S. state overseas officials interviewed contend that governors open political and business doors on overseas missions, many also point to the formalized nature of Asia’s political and business relations to indicate how governors are needed and received abroad. A full list of interviews is available in the Appendix.

2 A George Washington University survey finds that international relations are seldom managed at the highest levels with few states having a high-ranking official who spends much time on international affairs (Edisis 2003).
and Singapore and his secretary of foreign affairs visited Mexico over 40 times in 4 years (Lindlaw 1999; Powell 2003). California reported hosting 637 foreign dignitaries from 67 countries in 2001 (Conlan, Dudley, and Clark 2004). Teaford (2002:5) says U.S. states have “emerged as dynamic molders of domestic policy and vital providers of government services” since 1950 such that they now work on issues such as environmental, energy, and immigration policy.

In their roles as principal economic ambassador, governors are seen abroad as “high-prestige, high-impact heads of state.” Thus, a National Governors Association (2002:16, 23) report explains that governors must “take the lead in ensuring the competitiveness of their states’ businesses in the global marketplace.” Although the aims of states’ overseas offices usually remain consistent, all overseas officials interviewed agree that goals may change due to market fluctuations or gubernatorial priorities (Personal Interviews with U.S. States’ Overseas Officials 2006). Gov. Tom Ridge reorganized Pennsylvania’s economic development department and ordered offices to focus 75% of resources on trade promotion, while also recruiting investment and promoting tourism. When Gov. Ed Rendell took office, he reversed priorities, telling offices to focus on investment (Lieberman 1999; Telephone Interview with PA Overseas Official 2006).

The lack of state government control in international trade agreements is a point of contention because states depend on the USTR to represent their interests. Although U.S. states’ concerns might be voiced by their Congressional delegation, USTR is the main actor in negotiating trade agreements as well as any dispute resolution proceedings, many of which “do not reach Congress” (Beaumont 1996:378). In 2003, 30 states’ attorneys general signed a letter “calling for greater protections of state interests in trade agreements” (Whatley 2003:10). Governors also seek to gain promises that U.S. states will be consulted in negotiations before a U.S. challenge to other countries’ subnational measures (Beaumont 1996:382–383). By making sure that all factors are pondered, governors are also aware that—no matter if their efforts are naught—their voiced concerns will lessen the blame that they may receive if their state is adversely affected by a trade agreement. In the Uruguay Round negotiations, the United States only agreed to apply procurement regulations to its states that “voluntary consented” to restrictions. In the end, 37 governors concurred (Kline 1999).

Governors also occasionally take politically oriented positions on U.S. foreign policy, attend global conferences, and sign agreements with national and subnational actors. Kline (1996) notes several governors have challenged sending National Guard troops to various locations. Recently, all 50 governors signed a letter requesting that President Bush reoutfit their “depleted National Guards” (Scharnberg 2007). In 1996 Gov. Lawton Chiles announced a plan to “promote democracy and business” in Haiti as part of a joint partnership between Haiti and Florida, creating training programs for Haitian government officials in Florida and “a clearing house in Miami that will match businesses in Florida with needs in Haiti.” Illegal immigration was one reason behind the partnership which required Congressional approval (Chepak 1996:6). Chiles traveled to Haiti in May 1995 as part of a “goodwill mission,” meeting Haiti’s president (Kaplow 1995). In 2004 Gov. Jeb Bush visited Haiti and some believe he disagreed with President George W. Bush about giving temporary protected status to Haitians in the United States upon his return (Associated Press 2004; St. Petersburg Times 2004).

Although most governors avoid foreign policy issues, some such as New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson, a former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, are actively involved in foreign policy. Oregon Gov. Ted Kulongoski called upon President Bush to provide an exit strategy for Iraq (Linn 2004). With many National Guard troops deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, 30 governors visited Iraq by June 2006 (O’Connor 2006). Yet, it is important to not only recognize the transformation of governors’ roles, but U.S. states’ increasing global ties.
Bowman and Kearney (1986:11) identify constitutional reforms, institutional reforms and an intergovernmental lobby among the precipitators of a “resurgence of the states” that includes by-products such as an “expanding scope of operations,” as well as interstate cooperation, and a “faster diffusion of innovation.” Although some innovations have been political, most have been economic. A 2002 survey finds that nearly all U.S. states say “trade and investment promotion” is the main motivation for overseas missions, although two states claim “tourism promotion” is equally important. Two other states assert “political relations” as a top motivation, with California officials saying it is important to “develop political relationships first, and then build on these relationships to generate trade and investment opportunities” (Edisis 2003:6).

Kline (1999) contends most state involvement in highly politicized parts of U.S. foreign policy has been isolated incidents. Twenty-eight states sanctioned United States and foreign businesses operating in South Africa during apartheid before Congress passed restrictions (Fry 1998:5) and six states “adopted or amended statutes to penalize firms” that complied with the Arab boycott of Israel, although the later was preempted by an amendment to the Export Administration Act in 1977 (Kline 1999:113–115). The legislator who authored Massachusetts’ South Africa law wrote its Myanmar law of the same nature, declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2000 (Howard 2004). California “banned certain Swiss banks from bidding on billions of dollars of bond offerings and other contracts” because it was unhappy with their explanations concerning the “disposition of gold and other assets taken from Holocaust victims prior to and during World War II” (Fry 1998:5). These overtly political actions were all criticized by the U.S. State Department and had two goals: (i) raise the profile of the issue and (ii) pressure a foreign government to change its policies (Kline 1999).

The U.S. Constitution forbids states from entering into any compact with foreign powers. But in the past 30 years state and local governments have “entered into thousands of accords and agreements (but not ‘treaties’) with national and subnational governments” because “Congressional silence on what state governments do in the international system is generally considered as tacit approval of such activities” (Fry 1998:92, 279–280; see Henkin 1996:152–156). Especially since the 1970s, economic interdependence has “intersected traditional state government economic interests and prerogatives” such that U.S. states are important actors in foreign economic policy. This also changed the roles and expectations of U.S. state-level officials (Kline 1983:1).

The two main ways in which many U.S. states are engaged internationally are in their maintenance of international offices and governor-led overseas missions to promote exports and attract foreign direct investment (FDI). As the U.S. government is not involved in attracting FDI, it is left to states. On the export side, there is a complicated network of actors including state governments, the U.S. Department of Commerce (through the U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service), nonprofit world trade centers, chambers of commerce, and business consultancies (Kline 1983; Posner 1984; Whatley 2003). In 1954, New York opened the first state international office (Fry 1998). There were 224 total offices by 2004, including 20 offices in China (State International Development Organizations 2004). While missions can be proactive, U.S. states usually establish offices where their businesses already have ties (Ryen and Zelle 1997). Creation of international offices is an area in which the U.S. government has encouraged states, unlike other international activities (Beaumont 1996).

North Carolina Gov. Luther Hodges led the “first business delegation to western Europe in search of direct investment” in 1959 (Fry 1998:67). By 1979,
33 governors had led 84 missions overseas (Kincaid 1984). These trips range from one to many stops through one to several countries. Governor-led missions have two purposes: attract FDI and/or promote exports—with governors touring areas in which businesses hope to export. Many states emphasize “the advantages of networking and bringing larger groups of trade actors from specific markets or specific industries together” such that overseas offices coordinate networks rather than serving as direct matchmakers (Ryen and Zelle 1997:23).

It is important to consider governors’ roles on missions. U.S. state officials make many trips without governors, yet governor-led trips are important because officials claim governors are vital to missions. All U.S. state overseas officials interviewed say foreign business leaders view governors differently from other officials (Personal Interviews with U.S. States’ Overseas Officials 2006). When Georgia Gov. Zell Miller missed a China mission, it “lowered the trade mission’s profile to the point that the highest Chinese officials cancelled meetings” (Kunstel 1998:2E). The mission was not able to have some meetings without Miller, although travelers were assured their audiences included officials at “the appropriate level” (Quinn 1998:3E). This is analogous to what happens with national leaders, perhaps indicative of why theories can be applied to subnational governments.

Theoretical Considerations

Theories from the literature of IR, IPE, federalism, and foreign policy analysis are relevant to this study. While calling for expanding the definition of transgovernmental actors, this section will explain how an extension of institutional approaches might assist research.

International Relations

International relations theory still suffers from a realist bias of treating nation-states as unitary actors and has been slow to look beneath the national level. The three primary types of relations of governance in a global economy are intergovernmental relations (between national governments and heads of government), transgovernmental relations (bureaucrats in two governments working together), and transnational relations (between business interests, civil society groups and nongovernmental organizations) (Nye and Keohane 1971; Keohane and Nye 1974). Many scholars recognize the importance of transnational relations and the many actors that cross boundaries in world politics such as multinational corporations (MNCs), the Catholic Church, and Ford Foundation (Huntington 1973; Gilpin 1987). Keohane and Nye (1974:41) draw the distinction between transnational actors as nongovernmental actors from transgovernmental actors, as “subunits of governments on those occasions when they act relatively autonomously from higher authority in international politics.” Yet, subsequent IR scholarship does not expand the definition of transgovernmental actors to the subnational level, instead always referring to national officials.

Even scholars who acknowledge the two-level games that exist between international and domestic politics (e.g., Putnam 1988) include only national-level domestic actors such as the U.S. Senate. Works within the two-level game framework, such as Keohane and Milner (1996), retain this focus upon national actors. Although Knopf (1993) attempts to extend the two-level game, he continues to leave subnational actors out. Recent analysis continues this pattern.

Therefore, IR literature has expanded beyond the unitary state to include national actors such as bureaucracies as well as nonstate actors such as MNCs and interest groups, but continues to ignore subnational governments such as U.S. states. Rosenau (1990) argues that scholars need to expand their scope
because problems are not segregated to one level of government. Starr (2006) reminds scholars that it is imperative to cross boundaries in considering levels of analysis and encourages collaboration across subfields of political science to advance theory and research. Perhaps realist and liberal theory have encouraged scholars to look at the extremes—from the unitary state to individuals—thereby leaving out middle-level actors such as subnational governments.

For scholars who examine noncentral governments (NCGs) in world politics, most adopt the framework of interdependence theory from Keohane and Nye (2001) to think about the way in which U.S. states and governors interact in the world. These include Duchacek (1984, 1990), Fry (1998), Hocking (1993a), and Kline (1983, 1984), many noting that NCGs’ international activities has much greater presence in federal democratic systems, such as Canada and Germany, as compared with unitary systems. Kincaid (1984:105) agrees that the “primary stimulus” for governors’ international involvement has been economic. Yet, there is a theoretical gap that needs to be filled in IR such that scholars understand the importance of looking at how NCGs affect international politics, as detailed above. Another problem is that much of the scholarship on subnational actors’ international activities has been descriptive in nature, rather than explanatory or predictive, as Hocking (1993a) claims. Thus, transgovernmental relations need to be expanded to include subnational actors such as U.S. governors.

International Political Economy

U.S. foreign economic policy has systemic, societal, and institutional explanations (Ikenberry, Lake, and Mastanduno 1988). Institutional approaches allow for seeing how foreign policy is viewed as “constrained by domestic institutional relationships that have persisted over time, and also by the ability of…officials to realize their objectives in light of both international and domestic constraints” (Ikenberry et al. 1988:2). But institutional theories of IPE have only been applied to national-level actors such that Baldwin (1985) focuses on the roles of the president, Congress, and International Trade Commission; O’Halloran (1994) looks at Congressional politics, and Destler (1995) overviews changes in policymaking within the Congress, presidency, and executive departments and agencies to study U.S. trade policy.

International political economy literature cites the significance of Congress’s partisan makeup and changing presidential powers. Although federalism and state politics literature readily look at governors’ powers, they have not been adequately analyzed or incorporated into other fields. Beyle’s (2006) ratings for governors’ institutional powers (GIP) and governors’ personal powers (GPP) can be employed to apply an institutional approach as they include measures of partisanship in state legislatures and governors’ appointment and budget controls per year. Thus, they are somewhat akin to analysis of presidential power over economic policymaking. Another measure to use is Beyle’s measure of governors’ formal economic development powers (GEDP). GIP, GPP, and GEDP ratings should be utilized because scholars continue to find conceptions of gubernatorial power to be a useful indicator for explaining differences in U.S. state politics. As Ikenberry (1988:220) contends, politicians can be “instrumental in interpreting the nature of international pressures or imperatives.” Governors respond to the global economy by leading overseas missions and hosting foreign delegations. Perhaps looking at GIP will show how governors can more aptly shape U.S. state interests in foreign policy.

Ikenberry et al. (1988:10) note that one institutional approach sees the nation-state “primarily as an organizational structure, or set of laws and institutional arrangements shaped by previous events” and shows that institutions can “influence policy even after the ideas and coalitions that initially gave rise to them no
longer dominate.’’ This seems to substantiate looking at the activities of U.S. states and governors through the lens of gubernatorial power, especially institutional powers. Another approach focuses on politicians “as independent participants in the policy process” to evaluate how they “respond to internal and external constraints in an effort to manipulate policy outcomes in accordance with their [own] preferences” (Ikenberry et al. 1988:10). This approach demonstrates the need to examine gubernatorial power from another angle, such as personal powers from governors’ electoral mandates and responsiveness to public opinion, as well as the interests governors bring to office.

**Federalism**

Federalism scholarship has a long history examining subnational actors’ international activities. Henkin (1996:167) writes, “The principal influence of the [U.S.] states in foreign relations derives from the constitutional, decentralized, federal framework of government and the political forces that animate it.” But scholars disagree about the impetus of these activities. Fry (1998) warns that U.S. states may infringe upon federal roles, but Rosenau says transnational issues have pulled U.S. states into the international realm, not a motivation to challenge national sovereignty (Blase 2003).

Changing capabilities and expectations of subnational actors have also been significantly altered. Kincaid (1996:29) notes that the U.S. has moved from dual federalism (1789–1932) to cooperative federalism (1932–1968) to coercive federalism in which overarching considerations to national public policy “shaped largely by concerns about national and regional externalities and individual rights” means that national power “penetrates deeply into state and local affairs.” Yet, U.S. states’ and governors’ actions are “governed more by custom, political practice, and intergovernmental comity than by enforcement of constitutional and statutory rules” (Kincaid 1999:118). Conlan (1998) says the combination of the decline of the nation-state, policy effects of party realignment, fiscal trends, and modernization of U.S. state governments may lead to increased devolution, perhaps enabling more international activities. Although the U.S. government is involved in the responsibilities of state and local governments, many “national [and international] issues are becoming more and more localized” because of blurred boundaries of responsibility (Conlan 1988:235).

This study argues that examination of gubernatorial powers can help scholars understand which governors are likely to participate in U.S. foreign policy. Previous scholarship points in this direction since Conlan and Sager (2001) and Sager (2002) note that one reason for variation among U.S. states’ levels of international activities is political leadership, and Aldecoa and Keating (1999) acknowledge the importance of political and institutional factors. To aptly understand if political leadership enables foreign policy activities, this study incorporates three measures of gubernatorial powers.

There is debate about what to call the activities of NCGs—U.S. states in this study. “Paradiplomacy” is used to discuss the ways in which NCGs engage in international activities, whether in an economic, political, or cultural context through meetings with officials from other countries (Aguirre 1999). Duchacek (1990) breaks down paradiplomacy into three types. Transborder paradiplomacy includes the activities of subnational governments along national borders, such as Arizona working with Mexican officials. Transregional and paradiplomatic contacts involve links between NCGs “whose territorial jurisdictions are not

---

contiguous but whose national governments are neighbors,” such as Georgia’s international office in Ontario. Global paradiplomacy involves NCGs’ links with foreign national and subnational governments such as South Carolina’s office in Munich. These contacts are for the purposes of influencing trade, investment, or other policies (Duchacek 1990:16). Duchacek (1990:16) notes, “If by diplomatic negotiation we mean processes by which governments relate their conflicting interests to the common ones, there is, conceptually, no real difference between the goals of paradiplomacy and traditional diplomacy” because it involves negotiation and implementation of agreements.

Hocking (1993b:31, 36) says NCGs are involved in “multilayered diplomacy,” a complex diplomatic network rather than hierarchical relationships between national and subnational governments without “exclusive territories of the domestic and international.” While scholars recognize the state-centric ideas of IR, he contends that many have too often assumed that NCGs’ activities are of a unitary nature. Instead, NCGs are involved in “complex patterns of relationships both inside and outside their national settings, and embrace a diversity of interests” (Hocking 1993b:4). NCGs are involved in high politics and it is clear that “localities are developing international trade policies which may complement, or cut across, those of national governments” (5). Thus, Hocking (1993b:29) argues that NCGs are involved in activities that intrude upon both domestic and foreign policy environments such that they reflect and “reinforce the factors that have produced that interdependence.”

Hocking (1993a:87) says NCGs should be brought into multilayered diplomacy so that they are differentiated from nonstate actors trying to influence foreign policy. He argues that “policy management structures and processes” better link levels of government—perhaps aiding the linkages and cooperation, but not preventing conflict between actors as there are many vertical and horizontal differences. While central governments must develop foreign policies that comport with a diverse national agenda, NCGs’ interests “will usually be determined by a narrow range of domestic constituencies with more finely targeted objectives” (Hocking 1993a:69). This, however, is only somewhat accurate because there are more similarities than differences between U.S. states’ international interests, especially as foreign governments (such as Taiwan) and interest groups (such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee) seek to influence governors and U.S. state legislatures in their international agendas (Conlan et al. 2004).

Kincaid (1990) labels the international activities of NCGs as “constituent diplomacy.” For him, constituent governments are states, provinces, cantons, Länder, municipalities, and port authorities that “may represent local or regional, and sometimes national public sentiment more accurately than the elected leaders of opposition parties and the unelected leaders of interest groups to whom democratic pluralism accords a policy role” (Kincaid 1990:66). Therefore, he views NCGs’ foreign policy activities as greater democratic pluralism and contends that allowing foreign policy to be made only by central governments is a myth and suppresses political competition. Kincaid (1990:56) notes, “It is not accidental that the constituent governments most actively and openly engaged in world affairs are those of democratic, especially federal democratic, nations.” He says scholars should be asking about the benefits rather than the costs of NCGs’ activities such as economic benefits, intergovernmental lobbying enhancing regional equity, cross-cultural communication, and public understanding of international affairs.

Although pluralism allows both domestic and foreign interest groups to participate in U.S. foreign policymaking, activities of states and governors have been denounced. “The chairman of a corporation can criticize foreign policy, but a governor or mayor who does so may be criticized, at least until recently, for overstepping the bounds of propriety and his or her authority and competence”
U.S. states have, of course, noticed this trend such that a senior California trade official says U.S. officials “are anxious to see the states increasingly involved in trade promotion but not in the trade policy area” (Hocking 1993a:73). Thus, according to Kincaid and perhaps Hocking, federal democratic governments are best served by allowing NCGs to be part of foreign policymaking. Others, such as the National Foreign Trade Council, point out that these activities erode presidential authority over foreign affairs, thereby disrupting the unity of U.S. foreign policy and perhaps complicating its goals (Personal Interview with National Foreign Trade Council Official 2007; see Grimmett 2007).

Foreign Policy Analysis

Rosenau (1966) explains how idiosyncratic, role, governmental, societal, and systemic variables can be important factors in foreign policy analysis. Likewise, Kincaid (1984:109) argues governors’ international activities are very idiosyncratic because of “the perceptions of governors of their own proper roles as well as the proper roles of government.” This study attempts to further this goal by looking at governors’ idiosyncratic characteristics (such as prior jobs and future ambitions) as well as role and governmental variables by employing Beyle’s GIP, GPP, and GEDP scores. As previously mentioned, many interdependencies and advances resulting from globalization have also certainly enabled governors’ foreign policy participation.

Howard (2004) shows that U.S. states are not just involved in U.S. foreign policy from an economic perspective, but also partake in defense policy through the involvement of their National Guard units in the State Partnership Program (SPP). In SPP, National Guard units are paired with military units from other countries and, while deployed abroad, implement military and civilian programs. Howard claims the literature of both federalism and foreign policy analysis ignores the implementation of foreign policy, shown through the SPP. He argues that states help to implement U.S. defense policy. An extension of this argument is that states help implement U.S. trade relations. Howard (2004) says most foreign policy analysis leaves out U.S. states because Allison’s (1971) seminal work of bureaucratic politics extends the scope of decision making across executive departments, the White House, and Congress and scholars have been preoccupied with the horizontal nature of foreign policy. But analysis has not looked at the vertical dimensions of foreign policy, although U.S. states and cities have passed resolutions and lobbied their Congressional delegations in an attempt to affect foreign policy.

Breaking from the realist claim that systemic factors shape foreign policy behavior this literature looked within the nation-state. However, some scholars kept the unitary actor framework. Therefore, U.S. states and governors are overlooked in most works of foreign policy analysis. But governors, especially those conducting “transborder paradiplomacy” from U.S. states such as California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas, are involved in implementing agreements regarding immigration, educational exchanges, border security, tourism, and environmental cooperation. Case studies of governors’ roles in the implementation of foreign political and economic policies would assist future research.

Although Howard (2004) focuses on SPP and U.S. defense policy, it is important to think about the role governors play in shaping U.S. foreign economic
policy—such as Minnesota Gov. Jesse Ventura (and others) lobbying Congress for permanent trade relations with China (Hotakainen 2000), or governors’ roles in shaping relations with other countries through FDI attraction or state export promotion. According to Howard (2004), the National Guard is federally funded, but state controlled. “When not explicitly federalized by the president and called to active duty, the governors and their appointed adjutant generals retain complete control over their state’s guard” (Howard 2004:181). The mirror relationship applies on the economic side. U.S. foreign economic policy is state funded, but federally controlled. In other words, states fund most trade promotion programs and fully fund FDI attraction and governors’ missions abroad. Thus, U.S. states in some ways control, but do not fund, their relationship to foreign defense policy, but fund and do not control their relationship to foreign economic policy.

This section argues for augmenting IR theories to consider subnational actors as transgovernmental actors, extending institutional approaches to study U.S. governors, furthering Rosenau’s (1966) goal of looking at idiosyncratic, role, and governmental variables, and broadening foreign policy analysis to consider the vertical dimensions of foreign policy implementation. The next section looks at empirical data to see what factors might enable governors to participate in foreign policy, a question lacking systematic analysis thus far.

Why Do Governors Participate in Foreign Policy?

This paper begins to explain why governors voice their views and participate in U.S. foreign policy by examining the governors of 14 states over 10 years, 1995–2004. Sample states include Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina.6 These states were selected because of their large variance in economic size, population, and gubernatorial powers, all factors aiding the generalizability of findings. The sample’s representativeness is confirmed such that the governors of these states have mean GIP, GPP, and GEDP ratings within the 95% confidence interval of all states.7 The sample also has geographic diversity, using the eight regional classifications of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). However, the sample states’ means of per capita inflation-adjusted FDI is lower than the average for all states, so the average state in this sample is not as economically vibrant—and perhaps less internationally engaged — (at least economically) as the average U.S. state in this time period.

When looking at NCGs’ international activities, measurement problems have been noted (Duchacek 1984; Kincaid 1984). For this paper, foreign policy is defined as the “scope of involvement abroad and the collection of goals, strategies, and instruments that are selected by governmental policymakers,” although foreign policy can involve nongovernmental actors (Rosati and Scott 2007:4). Thus, the dependent variable is an index of foreign policy activities that governors may or may not participate in, all counted equally for each year of analysis.

The index is composed of seven areas of activity for each year: (i) the number of governor-led missions outside the U.S. promoting trade and/or seeking investment, (ii) number of international trips to global summits or conferences, (iii) high-level meetings (defined as those with heads of state, heads of

---

6 Governors included in analysis are: James, Siegelman, Riley (AL); Symington, Hull, Napolitano (AZ); Wilson, Davis, Schwarzenegger (CA); Romer, Owens (CO); Rowland, Rell (CT); Chiles, Bush (FL); Edgár, Ryan, Blagojevich (IL); Carlson, Ventura, Pawlenty (MN); Nelson, Johanns (NE); Johnson, Richardson (NM); Pataki (NY); Kitzhaber, Kulongoski (OR); Ridge, Schweiker, Rendell (PA); Beasley, Hodges, and Sanford (SC).

7 Beyle (2006) has not calculated GIP, GPP, and GEDP ratings for all states for all years of analysis. The author calculated all missing GIP, GPP, and GEDP scores for all states, 1995–2004.
government, their immediate successors, national cabinet ministers, or ambassadors to the U.S.—whether they occur abroad or in the U.S., usually in state capitals), (iv) lower-level meetings (defined as those with foreign officials such as subnational leaders, consuls, or “foreign delegations”), (v) statements in favor of U.S. foreign policy, (vi) statements against U.S. foreign policy, and (vii) miscellaneous activities related to foreign policy, such as lobbying Congress on behalf of trade liberalization with China, lobbying the Pentagon for a particular weapons system, or heading up an effort that says governors support Israel and the Middle East peace process. Each one of these activities is counted as “one,” including governors’ statements both in favor and against U.S. foreign policy for each public position voiced. Therefore, this variable does not reflect the number of media stories that developed because of positions taken. However, governors might have voiced their views on an issue several times during 1 year (and therefore counted as such). One example is Minnesota Gov. Jesse Ventura’s opposition to the U.S. trade embargo with Cuba (Hotakainen 2000; Ragsdale 2000). The dependent variable is compiled by adding up scores of all parts of this index. Data for this foreign policy activities index come from archives of U.S. states’ major newspapers in Lexis-Nexis Academic with the same search terms used for all governors in sample states. Data about governor-led overseas missions are augmented from correspondence and interviews with U.S. state officials.

This study explicitly examines the foreign policy activities of governors. Therefore, data only involve governors’ actions and initiatives, rather than those led by state legislatures, as was the case with Massachusetts’ Myanmar law and the recent bills seeking divestment from Sudan and Iran in Illinois and Missouri (McKinley 2007). For example, even though the Illinois House passed a resolution in May 1998 urging Congress to lift the embargo against Cuba, the only activities that are counted for Illinois Gov. George Ryan are his own meetings with Cuba’s emissaries in the U.S. and his meetings with Fidel Castro in Cuba, as well as his own statements against the U.S. embargo (Loven 1999).

Three categories of hypotheses derive from the literature of IR, IPE, foreign policy analysis, and federalism. Therefore, greater economic interdependence of a state should lead to greater foreign policy activities by that state’s governors. Given institutional approaches from federalism and IPE, greater institutional and personal powers of governors should also have a positive correlation. With greater institutional and personal powers, governors should be more able to shape overall strategy and policy—perhaps more able (and willing) to participate in foreign policy, whether because they have the institutional capability to control the bureaucracy, or because they have a large electoral mandate. Kincaid (1984:104–5) notes “individual preferences, partisan affiliations, and constituency opinion pressure may lead a governor to express opinion on any foreign policy issue.” Thus, governors who have been members of Congress, U.S. Senators, or U.S. Ambassadors before the governorship are expected to be more involved in foreign policy activities, as well as those that aspire to higher public office involving foreign policy, such as a candidate for U.S. Senate or president. The seven hypotheses appear below.

**Economic Explanations:**
- H1: Foreign policy activities should rise with an increase in state FDI.
- H2: Foreign policy activities should rise with an increase in state exports.

**Institutional Explanations:**
- H3: Foreign policy activities should rise with an increase in GIP.
- H4: Foreign policy activities should rise with an increase in GPP.
- H5: Foreign policy activities should rise with an increase in GEDP.
Governors’ Individual Preferences Explanations:

H6: Foreign policy activities should rise if the governor is a former Member of Congress, U.S. Senator, or U.S. Ambassador.

H7: Foreign policy activities should rise if the governor declares his or her candidacy for the U.S. Senate or the presidency.

Model and Independent Variables

A negative binomial regression model (NBRM) is used because the foreign policy activities among governors in this sample have a Poisson distribution and count variables should not be treated with linear models (Long 1997). King (1988) notes the problems running a linearized regression model such as ordinary least squares (OLS) on data that do not have a normal distribution, and Long (1997:231) describes the NBRM as one in which variation in the mean is “due both to variation in $\times$ among individuals but also to unobserved heterogeneity” introduced by random error. By counting all activities in categories of the foreign policy activities index equally (as 1’s) the model has introduced random error. Ideally, we would know which types of activities matter more to governors’ foreign policy actions—that is one overseas mission has a greater value than a public statement about U.S. foreign policy. As we do not know these activities’ rankings in this preliminary analysis, it seems prudent to treat them equally. Below are the descriptions of the independent variables in this analysis.

U.S. State Foreign Direct Investment:

U.S. states use a variety of measures to calculate their FDI per year, so statistics from the BEA are needed to compare across states. As the BEA does not compute an aggregate measure of each state’s FDI, the only standardization of FDI is the measure of gross property, plant and equipment of U.S. affiliates by state (Telephone Interviews with BEA Officials, 2005, 2006). Per capita FDI is calculated by dividing FDI by the state’s total population for each year.8

U.S. State Exports:

Export data collected by the U.S. Census come from WISERTrade. Data are labeled as State Exports by country of destination in the Origin of Movement series, “the most popular state export database” (WISERTrade 2006).9 State’s per capita exports are calculated by dividing exports by state population for each year.10

Governors’ Institutional Powers, Personal Powers, and Economic Development Powers:

Beyle’s (2004:210–218) annual GIP ratings is a five-point scale from six categories: separate elected state-level officials; tenure potential (term limits); appointment power; budget control; veto power; and party control of the legislature. Beyle’s (2004:205–210) GPP rating has four categories—electoral mandate (margin of victory); ambition ladder (progression from sub-state to statewide office); personal future (how much time governors have left in office/reelection eligibility); and gubernatorial performance (state-level public opinion polls) to create a

---

8 FDI statistics are converted to inflation-adjusted values, using 2000 as a base year, as provided for by the BEA.
9 The OM series is the only state export data currently released by the Census Bureau and “comes from export documentation filed by the exporter with U.S. Customs which asks for the two-character state abbreviation of the state of origin of movement.” OM is defined as: (i) state where the product began its journey to the point of export, (ii) state of consolidation of shipments or (iii) state of greatest value in the case of consolidation, or (iv) state of a foreign trade zone (WISERTrade 2006).
10 Export statistics are converted to inflation-adjusted values, using 2000 as a base year, as discussed by the BEA.
five-point scale.\textsuperscript{11} Beyle (1983) outlines GEDP ratings by looking at governors’ appointment powers of the heads of the 10 government areas related to the economy; commerce, economic development, finance, higher education, transportation, labor, utilities, revenue, tourism, and budget. This five-point scaled index is outlined in Grady (1991).

\textit{Party Variables:}
As Kincaid (1984) notes, party affiliation may help to explain why governors take foreign policy positions. As the governors’ party is always included in U.S. state politics literature and may be an explanatory factor, it is included in analysis. Governors’ party affiliation is coded as a dichotomous variable, where Republican = 0, and Democrat = 1. Whether the governor’s party affiliation matches with that of the president is also coded as a dummy variable where 0 = party match and 1 = no party match.\textsuperscript{12}

\textit{Governors’ Individual Preferences Variables:}
Although Beyle’s GPP rating includes an “ambition ladder” that measures progression from sub-state to statewide office and “personal future,” a measure of how much time governors have left in office, it is important to look at proxies of governors’ presumed interests. Therefore, whether governors were Members of Congress, U.S. Senators, or U.S. Ambassadors before entering the governor’s mansion is coded as a “1” into the prior job(s) index variable. It is also important to see if governors’ future plans affect their foreign policy involvement such that if a governor is a candidate for the U.S. Senate or the presidency in the next election it is coded in the future job(s) index variable. Although most governors have a zero or one in the prior job or future job variables for each year, New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson has a “2” for prior jobs because he served as a Member of Congress and Ambassador to the UN. Although we can know what previous jobs governors have held, we have limited knowledge about governors’ future ambitions until they make their intentions publicly known. Thus, many governors may eventually run for president, but data are only coded for governors that formally announce their candidacy for president.

Several control variables are also included in the models. Socioeconomic variables can illustrate differences between states so unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor (2006) and state and local tax burdens from The Tax Foundation (2006) are incorporated as some U.S. state overseas officials say incentives can be important (Personal Interviews with GA, FL, MO, OR, PA, SC, and WV Overseas Officials 2006). \textit{Site Selection} magazine provides an annual ranking of U.S. states’ business climates that is widely used in state politics research, so this variable is included as a measure of states’ regulatory environments.\textsuperscript{13} Educational attainment of persons 25 years and over is used as measure of human capital and comes from the U.S. Census. The presence of the U.S. military in a war as well as U.S. states bordering Canada or Mexico are also coded as dichotomous variables.

As governors of U.S. states with international offices may be more prone to have foreign policy activities, the number of state international offices per year is

\textsuperscript{11} GIP and GPP ratings are available from Beyle (2006). As Beyle does not calculate GIP, GPP, and GEDP ratings for each year of analysis, the author calculated missing years’ scores. The Appendix includes the measurement rules and data sources for calculating these scores.

\textsuperscript{12} The original plan was to include presidential public opinion within each state for each year of analysis. Although the Job Approval Ratings database is helpful (see Beyle 2006), there are many missing data points, so this was dropped.

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Site Selection} only ranks the top 25 business climates, so states that were not ranked each year are coded with a 53 to denote all states plus the DC, Puerto Rico, and Guam. This method makes the coefficient very conservative.
included. The work of international offices is usually shaped by governors’ interests and priorities and their presence is one of the budget powers that governors share with state legislatures (Ryen and Zelle 1997; Fry 1998; Blase 2003; Whatley 2003). Data come from Ryen (1997), Council of State Governments (1999), National Association of State Development Agencies (1999), Whatley (2003), State International Development Organizations (2004), and correspondence and interviews with U.S. state officials, as well as U.S. state websites, annual reports, and newspaper archives.

Analysis and Interpretation

Figure 1 shows governors’ foreign policy activities increased after 1995, but dropped off after 1999 and slowly increased after 9/11. The most likely cause of the decline in 2000–2001 is U.S. states’ fiscal crises which affected everything from governors’ overseas missions for trade and investment to the attention that governors may have had to spend on international issues. Another cause for the large number of 1999 activities is that eight of the sample states had new governors this year, many with international-oriented agendas, such as California Gov. Gray Davis, Colorado Gov. Bill Owens, Florida Gov. Jeb Bush, and Minnesota Gov. Jesse Ventura.

Two different models are tested for analysis. Model 1 has no lagged variables, but model 2 includes a variable lagging foreign policy activities by 1 year to see if governors are more or less likely to be involved in foreign policy after socioeconomic, institutional, or political changes. For example, is there a lag effect for which changes in economic factors, or the state political environment influence governors to have greater or less foreign policy activities? Do economic problems encourage governors to spend less time with transborder or transregional paradiplomacy, or do they encourage greater global paradiplomacy? As the various categories of foreign policy activities such as overseas trips cannot always be planned quickly, some activities may occur in the following year. Lagging the dependent variable essentially tests whether governors are more responsive to or initiators of foreign policy activities. Although the dependent variable ranges from 0 to 23, it intuitively makes sense that a jump from two to three activities is more difficult than moving from 21 to 22. The NBRM accounts for heterogeneity already in the model and any random error introduced through the research design.

The results show that governors with greater institutional and personal powers are more likely to take part in foreign policy. It makes sense from the perspective of federalism and state politics literature that governors with greater institutional controls—such as appointment power, tenure potential, and veto power—could have a greater degree in shaping their U.S. state’s international programs and strategies to deal with international forces and problems. More institutional powers also means that governors have increased party control and can attempt to gain support for new initiatives, perhaps through paradiplomacy. Higher GIP ratings may also illustrate that foreign subnational and national officials believe these governors can make a difference with issues that affect their countries, whether an economic or politically related issue such as identification cards for illegal immigrants. However, it seems that overall institutional powers of governors (measured through GIP) are more important in orienting governors toward foreign relations than only those powers related to economic development, evidenced by the negative, statistically significant variable of GEDP in

---

14 A Council of State Governments official notes that everyone was talking about globalization by the mid- to late-1990s and that state budgets were doing well until the 2000–2001 fiscal crisis (Personal Interview 2007).
both models. This may also illustrate the importance of looking beyond the eco-
nomic orientation of governors’ foreign policy activities.

The highly statistically significant finding of GPP in both models validates
previous research, such as Kincaid (1984) and Conlan and Sager (2001),
which argue that governors’ personal interests seem to drive their involvement
in international activities. Thus, governors with larger electoral mandates and
higher state-level public opinion feel more confident voicing their foreign pol-
icy views and engaging in these activities. Greater GPP also means governors
have more time left in office, so perhaps some of these activities indicate that
the governor is: (i) adequately working with other subnational leaders to solve
problems such as border security or (ii) adequately seeking to create jobs
through investment or exports in order to win reelection—or prepare for the
next campaign. The high degree of statistical significance of GPP in models 1
and 2 may be interpreted to mean that governors’ foreign policy activities
take advantage of current state public opinion and enable governors to partic-
ipate in these activities during the following year. Perhaps this shows that
governors use public opinion to their favor rather than trying to court public
opinion with foreign policy activities that would be evidenced if the variable
was only significant in model 2. Yet, the true causal relationship between
governors’ foreign policy activities and these variables cannot be determined
in this initial study.

Beyle’s GPP index includes an “ambition ladder” that looks at the progression
from sub-state to statewide office. Yet, the research design also coded governors’
relevant prior job(s) because it was hypothesized that some experiences might
lead to greater foreign policy interest or knowledge. The lack of significance of
the prior job index variable—former service as a Member of Congress, U.S. Sena-
tor, or U.S. Ambassador—may be interpreted to mean that many recent gover-
nors, not just those with these former jobs, have greater interests in international
issues or see them as affecting their U.S. state in some way. The future jobs
index is statistically significant, but in the wrong direction. While this may not
make sense, it is crucial to remember that we cannot know what posts governors
may seek after office. For example, Bill Clinton was a longtime Arkansas gover-
nor before he ran for president and while New York Gov. George Pataki has
been rumored to be a presidential contender for several years, he has never
declared his candidacy. The only governors pursuing higher office in this study
are California Gov. Pete Wilson (running for president) and Nebraska Gov. Ben

![Fig 1. Sums of Sample Governors’ Foreign Policy Activities, 1995–2004.](image-url)
The surprising findings are in regard to the hypotheses made about economic interdependence. States’ FDI is neither positively correlated with governors’ foreign policy activities nor statistically significant and while state exports are a significant variable in both models, it has a negative impact. Perhaps a decline in state exports encourages governors to be more active in international issues, such as promoting state products abroad. (It is important to note that FDI and exports are measured in per capita terms for comparison across U.S. states, so Nebraska may have greater economic interdependence than may be commonly thought.)

As an indicator of the importance of economic variables, governors are more likely to be involved in foreign relations as their state’s unemployment rate drops. U.S. states with lower tax burdens are positively correlated with heightened levels of governors’ foreign policy participation perhaps because many U.S. states that are aggressively attempting to attract FDI lower their tax rates. (It is important to note that FDI and exports are measured in per capita terms for comparison across U.S. states, so Nebraska may have greater economic interdependence than may be commonly thought.)

As an indicator of the importance of economic variables, governors are more likely to be involved in foreign relations as their state’s unemployment rate drops. U.S. states with lower tax burdens are positively correlated with heightened levels of governors’ foreign policy participation perhaps because many U.S. states that are aggressively attempting to attract FDI lower their tax rates. (It is important to note that FDI and exports are measured in per capita terms for comparison across U.S. states, so Nebraska may have greater economic interdependence than may be commonly thought.)

Table 2 also indicates that governors of one party are not more likely to be involved in foreign policy. The party match variable is not significant such that no governor is more likely to be involved in foreign policy based on their party alignment.

15 Nelson served as governor from 1991 to 1999 and was elected to the U.S. Senate in November 2000.
governors do not seem to participate in foreign policy more when a president of the opposite party occupies the White House. Although the sample includes a majority of Republican governors, it is worth remembering that there were more Republican governors each year between 1995 and 2004, with a high of 32 Republicans governors in 1997 and 1998.

Border states’ governors are also much more likely to be involved in foreign policy. This fits with assumptions in the literature as these governors are more likely to meet with their counterparts in Canada and Mexico as well as deal with issues such as immigration and border security in a greater degree. War also seems to be a good determinant of increased foreign policy activities, perhaps because many National Guard units are involved in the current war. Data indicate governors’ public statements pro- and anti-U.S. foreign policy are more likely to occur since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Since data only go through 2004, future analysis should see if this relationship holds in the following years.

Conclusions

Scholars do not yet have a strong empirical or theoretical grasp on governors’ roles and motivations for participation in U.S. foreign policy. This paper describes how governors are involved in foreign policy as well as offers some insights into what factors facilitate governors’ participation in U.S. foreign relations. Therefore, this study attempts to answer Kline’s (1996:343) call for scholars to study the “motivations, strategies, and methods of state and local involvement in transgovernmental and transnational interactions” with relation to the political and economic aspects of U.S. foreign policy. Theoretically, it fits within a long vein of research within foreign policy analysis by examination of idiosyncratic, role, and governmental variables as well as attempting to extend the arguments within federalism that political leadership is likely to be an important determinant of the level of international activities of U.S. states and governors.

Rising institutional powers of governors over the last 50 years may give today’s governors the capability to participate in foreign policy activities. With the significance of GIP and GPP in the models, governors seem to take advantage of their institutional and personal powers relative to international concerns. Examples of this include governors that have helped initiate and create structures for the management and coordination of international issues, such as California’s secretary of foreign affairs position, Hawaii’s Office of International Affairs, and Kentucky’s Office of Federal and International Relations (Conway and Nothdurft 1996; Edisis 2003). But this study does not argue that foreign policy participation has been institutionalized among governors. The fluctuation of activities across all states, indicated by Figure 1, as well as within individual states prevents this conclusion from being drawn. Rather, the results of this study only demonstrate that institutional powers enable governors to have higher degrees of participation with international and foreign policy concerns.

Idiosyncratic variables such as governors’ personal interests and powers measured through GPP remain the most important predictor of foreign policy participation. It seems that public support is necessary for governors’ foreign policy activities, combined with a likely personal interest by the governor—albeit not fully captured by the GPP index. Future research should seek to better measure international interests of governors as a predictor of their foreign policy actions. Thus, we should know that a governor with Bill Richardson’s resume and interests is more likely to participate in foreign policy even if we cannot predict that his activities would include high-level talks with North Korean officials and negotiations for a ceasefire in Darfur (State of New Mexico 2006; Polgreen
Governors’ aspirations for future jobs may also be an indicator, but coding problems highlight the degree to what we do not know about governors’ future ambitions while they are in office. One example is that Colorado Gov. Bill Owens has been thought to aspire to the presidency, a U.S. Senate seat, or an ambassadorship but has not publicly acknowledged such rumors. It is also worth noting that the negative correlation of the future jobs index shows that it is not only governors with easily identified ambitions for higher office that participate in foreign policy.

This analysis does not presume that it has captured all the various differences among U.S. governors, but this study and the variables included offer a broad picture and explanation of governors’ motivations. While GPP seem to be a primary motivation in this study, a U.S. State Department official says he believes most governors sincerely think that they are representing their state’s or their citizens’ interest with these actions. Thus, while governors’ personal interests are essential, the primary initiative may come from the governor’s belief in a real or perceived effect upon the state (Telephone Interview with U.S. State Department Official 2007). Scholars should attempt to study how governors view their own international roles, what outside forces they view as affecting their U.S. state, and for what reasons.

Kincaid (1984) says governors’ international activities depend upon individual preferences. It also seems that changing perceptions and expectations of governors to be involved in foreign policy may have altered as a result of the modernization of the governorship. This may be the case as governors from U.S. states as diverse as Florida, Nebraska, New York, and North Dakota participate in foreign policy. Scholars need to further study the shifting expectations of governors’ international roles and better diagnose the mechanisms for foreign policy activities to understand whether governors’ participation is more as innovative problem solvers or as responders to issues they confront in office. This topic has even greater significance as many recent U.S. presidents are former governors.

Findings also indicate that it is necessary for scholars to think beyond reasons of economic interdependence and attempt to more adequately measure governors’ institutional and personal powers that enable and motivate them to participate in U.S. foreign relations. Analysis shows that governors with overall institutional capabilities are more likely to participate in foreign relations whereas GEDP are not as valuable and negatively correlated. Lower state unemployment rates may give governors an incentive to tackle international issues. As these sample states are not as economically vibrant as the average U.S. state, this topic requires more study and analysis to better identify how increased levels of investment and trade relate to governors’ foreign policy activities.

Research should also attempt to ascertain what effects governors’ activities have upon U.S. foreign policy. Blase (1998) says these activities may have come to be accepted practice, although scholars still debate whether U.S. states and governors’ participation is normatively positive or negative (Kincaid 1990; Clough 1994; Denning and McCall 2000). As Fry (1998) and Henkin (1996) observe that Congress continues to allow U.S. states to sign international agreements and Conlan et al. (2004) find that there is limited involvement by federal officials regarding state legislatures’ international activities, there may not be as many effects upon intergovernmental relations as some assume, especially as some U.S. state officials complain about the lack of cooperation with federal authorities (Fry 2007; Personal Interview with Council of State Governments Official 2007).

This paper emphasizes how several theoretical areas—IR, IPE, and foreign policy analysis literature particularly—should broaden their scope of analysis to reassess conceptions of the power and capabilities of subnational officials. IR theory must consider subnational actors as transgovernmental actors and foreign policy
analysis should look at the vertical dimensions of foreign policy implementation. Federalism scholars should continue their interest in this topic and perhaps institutional approaches allow for systematic study. National governments have, for too long, been the primary unit of analysis for research on foreign policy, ignoring the fact that U.S. states implement many foreign policy decisions and the numerous global connections of governors. Hopefully this study stimulates scholarship about governors’ participation in U.S. foreign policy, a topic with many research possibilities.

References


HOTAIKAINEN, ROB. (2000) Ventura to Congress: Don’t Blow Trade Deal; On Capitol Hill, the Governor Said Permanent Relations with China Would Help Minnesota Businesses and Farmers. Star Tribune, March 31, 1A.


Below is a list of the U.S. state and federal government departments or agencies and nongovernmental organizations associated with those officials that the author conducted personal or telephone interviews with or had personal correspondence with in connection with this research.

**Appendix**

**Personal Interviews**


Oregon Department of Economic and Community Development Overseas Official. May 9, 2006.


**Telephone Interviews**

Nebraska Department of Economic Development. November 9, 2005.
New Mexico Department of Economic Development. April 26, 2006.
South Carolina Department of Commerce. November 11, 2005.
South Carolina Office of the Governor (former official). November 18, 2005.

**Personal Correspondence**

Connecticut Department of Economic and Community Development. March 21, 2006.
Oregon Department of Economic and Community Development. October 25–November 10, 2005.
South Carolina Department of Commerce. October 21, 2005.

Beyle’s Gubernatorial Power Rating Scores

Governors’ Institutional Powers:
The GIP rating is a five-point scale from six categories: separate elected state-level officials; tenure potential (term limits); appointment power; budget control; veto power; and party control (Beyle 2004:210-218). Below are the measurement rules for GIP ratings with data coming from The Book of the States and the National Council of State Legislatures. All available GIP and GPP scores and measurement rules are in Beyle (2006).

- **Separately elected executive branch officials**: 5 = only governor or governor/lieutenant governor team elected; 4.5 = governor or governor/lieutenant governor team, with one other elected official; 4 = governor/lieutenant governor team with some process officials (attorney general, secretary of state, treasurer, and auditor) elected; 3 = governor/lieutenant governor team with process officials, and some major and minor policy officials elected; 2.5 = governor (no team) with six or fewer officials elected, but none are major policy officials; 2 = governor (no team) with six or fewer officials elected, including one major policy official; 1.5 = governor (no team) with six or fewer officials elected, but two are major policy officials; 1 = governor (no team) with seven or more process and several major policy officials elected.

- **Tenure potential of governors**: 5 = 4-year term, no restraint on reelection; 4.5 = 4-year term, only three terms permitted; 4 = 4-year term, only two terms permitted; 3 = 4-year term, no consecutive election permitted; 2 = 2-year term, no restraint on reelection; 1 = 2-year term, only two terms permitted.

- **Governor’s appointment powers in six major functional areas**: corrections, K-12 education, health, highways/transportation, public utilities regulation, and welfare. The six individual office scores are totaled and then averaged and rounded to the nearest. Five for the state score. 5 = governor appoints, no other approval needed; 4 = governor appoints, a board, council or legislature approves; 3 = someone else appoints, governor approves or shares appointment; 2 = someone else appoints, governor and others approve; 1 = someone else appoints, no approval or confirmation needed.

- **Governor’s budget power**: 5 = governor has full responsibility, legislature may not increase executive budget; 4 = governor has full responsibility, legislature
can increase by special majority vote or subject to item veto; 3 = governor has full responsibility, legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget; 2 = governor shares responsibility, legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget; 1 = governor shares responsibility with other elected official, legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget.

- **Governor’s veto power:** 5 = governor has item veto and a special majority vote of the legislature is needed to override a veto (3/5s of legislators elected or 2/3s of legislators present); 4 = has item veto with a majority of the legislators elected needed to override; 3 = has item veto with only a majority of the legislators present needed to override; 2 = no item veto, with a special legislative majority needed to override a regular veto; 1 = no item veto, only a simple legislative majority needed to override a regular veto.

- **Gubernatorial party control:** The governor’s party—5 = has a substantial majority (75% or more) in both houses of the legislature; 4 = has a simple majority in both houses (under 75%), or a substantial majority in one house and simple majority in the other; 3 = split control in the legislature or a nonpartisan legislature; 2 = has a simple minority (25% or more) in both houses, or a simple minority in one and a substantial minority (under 25%) in the other; 1 = has a substantial minority in both houses.

**Total GIP rating:** sum of the scores on the six individual indices. The total score total divided by six to keep a five-point scale and is rounded to the one-tenth decimal place.

**Governors’ Personal Powers:**

Beyle’s (2004:205–210) GPP rating has four categories—electoral mandate (margin of victory); ambition ladder (progression from sub-state to statewide office); personal future (how much time governors have left in office/re-election eligibility); and gubernatorial performance (state-level public opinion polls) to create a five-point scale. Data come from U.S. states’ and governors’ websites and *The Book of the States* [governors’ ambition and personal future], news sources [for electoral mandate], and the U.S. Job Approval Ratings (JARS) database created by Beyle, Niemi, and Sigelman for public opinion data on governors and available at Beyle (2006). Below are the measurement rules for GPP ratings.

- **Governor’s electoral mandate:** 5 = landslide win of 11 or more points; 4 = comfortable majority of 6–10 points; 3 = narrow majority of 3–5 points; 2 = tight win of 0–2 points or a plurality win of under 50%; 1 = succeeded to office.

- **Governor’s position on the state’s political ambition ladder:** 5 = steady progression; 4 = former governors; 3 = legislative leaders or members of Congress; 2 = sub-state position to governor; 1 = governorship is first elective office.

- **The personal future of the governor:** 5 = early in term, can run again; 4 = late in term, can run again; 3 = early in term, term limited; 2 = succeeded to office, can run for election; 1 = late in final term. (Beyle calculated scores at various times during different years, so the author attempted to improve this variables’ systematic nature by basing all scores in June of each year of analysis.)

- **Gubernatorial job performance rating in public opinion polls:** 5 = over 60% positive job approval rating; 4 = 50–59% positive job approval rating; 3 = 40–49% positive job approval rating; 2 = 30–39% positive job approval rating; 1 = <30% positive job approval rating; n/a = no polling data available. (As more public opinion data are available now than when Beyle calculated his original scores, some GPP scores may have been altered. Any changes are noted in the author’s data.).
Total GPP rating: sum of the score on the five individual indices. This is divided by four and rounded to the nearest tenth, except for those states without a governor’s job performance rating where the sum is divided by three and rounded to the nearest tenth.

Governors’ Formal Economic Development Powers:
Beyle (1983) outlined procedures to measure GEDP by looking at appointment powers over “those agencies involved in managing some aspect of the state’s economy” using the formula below as outlined in (Grady 1991:113). The 10 areas of state government Beyle designated as related to the economy are commerce, economic development, finance, higher education, transportation, labor, utilities, revenue, tourism, and budget. As Beyle (2006) does not provide GEDP scores and Grady (1991) only calculated the percentages for 1986–1987, the author calculated these scores using the formula below for all years of analysis using data from *The Book of the States*.

\[
\text{Index} = \frac{\text{Values of } P_1 + P_2 + P_3 + P_4 + P_5 + P_6 + P_7 + P_8 + P_9 + P_{10}}{\text{Maximum values of } P_1 + P_2 + P_3 + P_4 + P_5 + P_6 + P_7 + P_8 + P_9 + P_{10}}
\]

Where \( P = 5 \), if the governor appoints; \( P = 4 \), if the governor appoints and one legislative chamber must confirm; \( P = 3 \), if the governor appoints and both legislative chambers must confirm; \( P = 2 \), if appointed by a council or administrator with the governor’s approval; \( P = 1 \), if appointed by an administrator or board without the governor’s approval; \( P = 0 \), if the position is elected.

Beyle (1983) does not specify a measurement for officials selected from the civil service, so officials are coded as a “1” because they do not have their own electoral mandate but rise through departments without necessarily receiving gubernatorial approval. Beyle also does not specify ratings for officials appointed by the cabinet and confirmed by the governor, so these officials are assigned a “2” much like officials appointed by a council.