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Interpreting the Experience of Tolerance

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Originary Temporality, the Origin of Modality, and the Question of the Limits of Toleration in Heidegger’s Being and Time

Temporalidad originaria, el origen de la modalidad, y la cuestión de los límites de la tolerancia en Ser y tiempo de Heidegger
En este ensayo, el autor se concentra en el fenómeno de la temporalidad originaria como "no teniendo nada que hacer con la temporalidad", como afirmó Tom Sheehan una década atrás. Intenta ofrecer una explicación de lo que temporalidad originaria podría significar aquí, brindando una descripción compatible con el proyecto general de la Segunda Parte de Ser y Tiempo, y que pueda hacer de la temporalidad originaria la fuente no sólo de nuestro sentido cotidiano del tiempo, sino también de lo que comúnmente llamamos normas, y de la modalidad en general.

Antes de ocuparse de la pregunta acerca de la temporalidad originaria, se aproxima brevemente a su principio seyecante y a su justificación, remontándose a Heráclito. Argumenta que la designación "temporalidad originaria" es el nombre para la conciencia fundamental, estricta, es decir dinámica, extendida, de nosotros y de nuestras vidas en términos históricos o temporales, de la que se deriva el sentido cotidiano de las dimensiones temporales, y de la normatividad en general —en tanto involucra la efección de un bien último aunque finito (un "Wertwillen") que consiste en una visión de la buena vida misma— esto es, de la modalidad, como un conjunto de posibilidades prácticas, a ser puestas en marcha por cada quien reconociendo su carácter finito (es decir, auténticamente). Concluye argumentando que no es del todo claro lo que se desprende en relación a la tolerancia si esta lectura es correcta.

In this essay, the A. concentrates on the phenomena of original temporality as "having nothing to do with temporality", as Tom Sheehan said a decade ago. He attempts an explanation of what original temporality could mean here, offering an account that fits in well with the overall project of the Second Division of Being and Time, and one that would make original temporality not only the source of the everyday sense of time, but also of what we commonly call norms, and of modality in general. Before he turns to the question about original temporality, he briefly approaches its underlying principle and its justification, turning to Heraclitus. He argues that the designation "original temporality" is the name for the ecstatic, i.e. dynamic, extended, fundamental awareness of ourselves and our lives in historical or temporal terms which derive the everyday sense of temporal dimensions, and of normativity in general —since it involves the choice of an ultimate albeit finite good (a "Wertwillen") that is a vision of the good life itself —i.e. of modality, as a set of practical possibilities, to be enacted by each recognizing its finite character (thus authentically). He concludes arguing why it is not quite as clear what follows with regard to toleration if this reading is correct.
§ 1. Introduction

Heidegger’s free use of the principle «a priori fit denomination» — loosely: «the name of a thing is to be taken from what it makes possible» or «the condition for the possibility of a thing deserves the name of that thing» — has not made the job of interpreters any easier. Whether with regard to truth, death, or originary temporality in Being and Time, or with regard to language or history in the middle and later Heidegger, the fact that what Heidegger is describing under those names is often something different from what we normally expect to see described as such has proven confusing and often frustrating to many (including me). To call atmospheric electricity «thunder» seems at the very least confusing, and perhaps even wrong. Yet, Heidegger’s use of this principle is also part of what has also made Heidegger’s works so powerful and intriguing at the same time. I myself don’t know where the principle comes from — I’d be grateful for any tips others of you might have for me in that direction — and I haven’t been able to find the other passage where I recall him stating the same principle in a slightly different way. However, over the years, I have begun to see some sense in the principle and I have come to believe that it can be very helpful in understanding what Heidegger is and is not claiming in the phenomenological descriptions that we are now so familiar with in Being and Time and other writings published during his lifetime (and yes, I do read Being and Time — and Heidegger’s middle and later essays also, for that matter — as phenomenological descriptions aimed at identifying eidetic structures that he calls «existentialis» in Being and Time and that describe the way that being takes place in the middle and later essays).

In this essay, I will be concentrating on the phenomenon of originary temporality that Heidegger describes in §§ 65-69 of Being and Time and trying to show that what Tom Sheehan said about a decade ago at a SPEP meeting in Seattle is perhaps overstated, but not untrue, namely that «originary temporality has nothing to do with temporality». I will be trying to provide an explanation of what originary temporality could mean here, an account that fits in well with the overall project

— All of the references to Heidegger’s Being and Time will be cited in the text using the abbreviation S&Z for the German title of the work and using the page numbers from the revised versions of the text published by Max Niemeyer Verlag (Tübingen) as the seventh and following editions beginning in 1953. These page numbers are also listed in the margins of most translations of Being and Time and of the Gesamtausgabe edition (Heidegger, Martin, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 2, Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977).
of the Second Division of Being and Time, and one that would make originary temporality not only the source of the everyday sense of time, but also of what we commonly call norms, and of modality in general.

Before I turn to the question about originary temporality, though, I'd like to say just a word or two more about the principle itself and its justification. Its use certainly has a long tradition, in fact going back at least to Heraclitus when he says, «The imperceptible harmony is more valid than the perceptible» (Fragment 51), or consciously uses the term «fire» as the name for an all-consuming principle that is itself not a natural phenomenon, but rather one that underlies nature. This way of using language has the advantage of taking something more abstract, less easily grasped on its own and of making its nature clear to us from something that is more familiar. Abstract principles like going-out-of-existence or finitude, for instance, can seem distant, hard to comprehend, even vapid unless they are connected to something whose power and whose basic features are better known to us, like fire or death. «Finitude» sounds so harmless, something that one can easily resign oneself to; death, on the other hand, is powerful, unsettling, disturbing. If Heidegger had referred to human finitude under that all too familiar and in almost harmless abstract name, it is unlikely not only that his analyses would have attracted so much attention, but also, that it would have as effectively conveyed the real implications of our finitude and how powerful the genuine awareness of our finitude can and should be for us.

Similarly, I will be arguing that the designation «originary temporality» is the name for the ecstatic, i.e. dynamic, extended, and yet inextricably interconnected aspects of how we are disclosed or aware of ourselves such that we can come to think of ourselves and our lives in historical or temporal terms and derive from this fundamental awareness the everyday sense of temporal dimensions that we use to organize events that take place around us. Moreover, the awareness is the source of normativity in general precisely because it involves the choice of a «Worumwillen», an ultimate good that is not outside of life, but is a vision of the good life itself. In Being and Time Heidegger calls this vision or, better, this envisaging a «projection». Most importantly, this good is not only not outside of life, but is the good life that I am to live, i.e. a possibility that because of its status as the recognized «Worumwillen» or ultimate good is not only a possibility, but a necessity for me once I have accepted it as such. This is where the notion of modality will come in, not originally as a set of theoretical implications, but of practical possibilities, necessities, and realities for me. Finally, this is not an infinite good, but a finite good. The recognition of the fact that this possibility is one that I am to make happen, that is to be enacted by me, if done authentically, must also take place in the recognition that the ultimate good is not an infinite good, but a finite good for which I am responsible as the «nichtiger Grund einer Nichtigkeit». That is why for Heidegger a description of originary temporality only makes sense against the backdrop of his analysis of one's facing (Vorlaufen) death, the call of conscience as the awareness of one's being guilty, and resoluteness, all of which, along with...
originary temporality, point to aspect of the same thing, namely our existence as *nichtiger Grund einer Nichtigkeit*, from which no one and nothing can relieve us.

In what follows, then, I will try to untangle this complicated knot a bit and use some concrete examples to make all of this a little clearer, and then at the end to say why I think it is not quite as clear what follows with regard to toleration if this reading is correct. My aim is not just to try to throw some light on Heidegger, but also to make clear why I think that Heidegger is describing a genuine phenomenon in an interesting and illuminating way here. For the purposes of this talk, I will be assuming that most of you are already familiar with the basic outlines of *Being and Time*. So instead of rehearsing in detail the descriptions of each of these phenomena as Heidegger presents them in that work, I will be referring to them in a general way, trying to put them together, and then using some fairly simple examples, trying to show how they fit together and can be read as describing a genuine and important phenomenon of human existence.

§ 2. The *Worumwillen*

In the First Division of *Being and Time*, Heidegger introduces the notion of world by way of an analysis of how objects within the world show up for us in our daily lives. The fundamental trait that this analysis reveals is that they have *Bewandtnis* or relevance in some way to us. They are meaningful not in themselves, but in reference to what can or cannot be done with them, how they affect us in our daily lives. «Relevance» points in two directions: something (an object within the world) is relevant for doing or accomplishing something (an activity). Hence «worldhood» is introduced by showing how things we encounter in our daily lives are organized around the way they fit into our goals and are well or ill-suited to helping us accomplish the thing we want to do, «possibilities of *Dasein*» he calls them. «World», then, is not a sum of objects within the world or a temporal-spatial realm within which objects are located, but a set of possibilities of *Dasein* that form the backdrop for how objects within the world appear for us. The analysis of another everyday phenomenon — that of fear — points in the same direction. What is feared is an object or event within the world that is feared because of its anticipated result for the life of some person or its affect on something that that person is attached to. What makes it frightful is not the thing in and of itself, but what it might do to affect the life of someone or other in some way, the way that it affects something that a person wants or does not want, holds dear, or considers important. «World» emerges again as the backdrop against which a thing is frightful or harmless, as the reason why it has the meaning it does for us.

While the rhetorical place of this discussion is in opposition to Cartesian, *i.e.* modern views about meaning and objectivity, these positions at the same time recall much older philosophical positions, *e.g.* the Stoic insights that what makes something attractive or fearful is not the thing itself, but my judgment about the
thing, which is determined by my wishes and aversions, what I consider necessary or important.

Moreover, Heidegger also points to the fact that these «possibilities of Dasein», as ways of doing things or reacting to things we encounter in our lives, are themselves organized into interrelated «contexts of meaning» (Bedeutungsverhältnisse) and that there is a hierarchical relationship between the levels of meaning, where objects are not only organized according to their function as means towards some end, which is a possibility of Dasein (hammers for driving in nails, and homes, for dwelling places), but that these possibilities themselves are organized into means/ends relationships (driving in nails to make a home, having a home to provide shelter, be a good investment, or impress one's friends) in which every means (a Wozu), be it an object or an activity, points to some other activity (in the broadest sense whereby even having things happen to you is an activity, a way of being [Seinsweise], or a possibility of Dasein that has meaning for us) from which it derives the significance it has, until ultimately one comes upon some possibility that has meaning in itself and for no other purpose outside itself. This is the Worum willen, the «for-the-sake-of-which», what I called the ultimate end, or what one might call the highest priorities in light of which all other things and activities derive the significance that they have for Dasein. Again, this is not something that is terribly new or controversial. If there existed any doubt about the degree to which these Heidegger's analyses draw on Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics on this point, the appearance of the early lecture courses in the Gesamtausgabe over the past few decades has settled the question2. Nor is it far from our everyday experience. It is in light of one person's concern for social status that it would be impossible for him to buy a house in that neighborhood and makes it unthinkable that it be anywhere else than in this one, even though the second house might be in less good shape than the other and cost a little more; whereas, another person's pride in her ability to make a good deal and ignore other people's views when they seem silly makes it seem obvious that buying the first house is the right thing to do. Or to use a different example: Is it a good or a bad thing if one of your colleagues is unjustly denied tenure? What should you do about it? If justice is important to you or you just like pointing out the weaknesses of your colleagues or the administration that is trying to commit this injustice, it is obvious you must try to prevent this if you can — unless of course that might cost you some good will or engender some animosity towards you that might cost you over time. But then, the question is how much you value justice over your own individual self-interest. Depending on how important those things are to you, you will come up

2 Ted Kiesel has traced out very carefully the development of this insight, one that he sees as inspired primarily by Aristotle, Paul, Kierkegaard (the latter transmitted by way of Jaspers). See Kiesel Theodore, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992, pp. 437. He concludes that linking the notions of ethical decision and meaning with originary temporality and its horizontal character was a mistake. Part of what I am trying to do in this paper is show that there is some phenomenological justification for it after all.
with very different answers about what you should do and what you will do. If what is important to you is your own status in the department and not so much abstract issues like justice, and if on top of that this is someone you don't like and who keeps showing you up by publishing so much in spite of a high teaching load and making everyone else look bad, then you will do whatever you can not to get in the way and perhaps even to help out.

What is good and bad, necessary or impossible, base or noble, welcome or unwelcome, horrible or wonderful, will depend on what you take to be your ultimate ends, your highest priorities. These need not be individual or selfish. Seeing justice happen, helping other people achieve their goals, being fair, being noble, taking care of one's family, pleasing God can be things that people can and actually have recognized as ends in themselves, things to do for the simple reason that these are the most important things for them. For others, social prestige might be a good, an end in itself. Again for others, being successful in fairly conventional terms might be the end in light of which having a family one can be proud of and contributing to the community in a way that others recognize as important will be subordinate ends that contribute to this overarching goal.

But who or what tells you whether your ultimate ends, your highest priorities are misplaced? Who or what tells you what really is important?

§ 3. The Good

Heidegger's answer is fairly well-known. In everyday life, things seem clear: success is important, being educated is better than not being educated, having money and professional success is more important that being educated, since getting an education is a way to get a good job and move up in society and not the other way around, some schools just are better than others, this simply is a better neighborhood than that one, and diamonds simply are a girl's best friend. The value of diamonds seems to be an inherent characteristic of diamonds. The attractiveness of the first-class address seems to be a feature of that neighborhood and not a mere social convention, Duke just is a better school than UNC Asheville, and things we know are social conventions, like what kind of clothes we should wear to a specific kind of work, and what things are fair and unfair in our social arrangements (the difference in pay scales between professors and custodians) seem so obvious that it is almost unimaginable that they could be in any other way. Some things that are common practice may seem a little bit out of whack to many people, like the pay that the star football coach gets compared to the star professor, but most things nonetheless look pretty obvious. The answer about what gives

meaning seems to be provided by the things and their inherent characteristics or it does not seem to be very controversial because everybody knows what is decent or indecent, good or bad, who is a winner and who is a loser, and what makes a life a successful or unsuccessful one.

By the way, it might be interesting to think about what all these oppositions share in common. The name we commonly use to lump these together is that they are «normative» notions. But what do we mean by «normative»? If we think about it for a second—and this point will become crucial later in this talk—what it means to call something «normative» is to say that it sets up a standard, it tells you not only what is, but what should or should not, must or must not be. More importantly, for a norm to be, it must be for someone, an agent who, based on the insight into the norm is supposed to be moved to preserve or enact what is to be desired and to alleviate, eliminate or avoid what is not to be desired according to that norm. Implicit in the notion of norm is the evaluation not just of things and states of affairs, but of actions, and more importantly, implicit in the norm is its power to urge or make necessary the action appropriate to bringing about the state of affairs that is consistent with that norm.

Another way to describe it is that each of them tells us in some sense or another what things are «good» and what are not. «Good» is not just the generic term for what is to be desired, it is also a term that from the beginning of Western philosophy (in some language or another) has functioned as the overarching term for that which is to be pursued. As far back as Plato, it became apparent that the appropriate question was not «why do you want the good?», since everyone does, but rather «what is good», since it is differing views about what really is good that lead people to act in different ways.

To return to our main point, however: Heidegger’s analysis of fallenness, as we have just paraphrased it, suggests that meanings are just there «in» the things within the world or that they are social conventions whose substantiality (to use Hegel’s term) consists in the fact that they seem as solid and objective as the brilliance or hardness of a diamond because there seems no one individual to whom they can be traced back as their source and hence no one who could simply revoke them and their power if he or she chose to do so.

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4 In Vom Wesen des Grundes, Heidegger states that what he is calling there the «transcendence of the world», is the same thing Plato was addressing as the problem of the ἀγαθόν (pp. 40-41), and under the name ἄρνησις or the «unwilled form», which —Heidegger says in apparent agreement with Plato— is the source of possibility as such, and hence also higher than (i.e.: the condition for the possibility of) actuality itself. A good overview of Heidegger’s discussion of Plato on these issues can be found in Peperzak, Adriaan. «Heidegger and Plato’s Idea of the Good», in Sallis, John (ed.), Reading Heidegger, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992, pp. 258-285.
What anxiety, as Heidegger describes it, reveals is that this substantiality is an illusion. In anxiety, things lose their meaning, their relevancy becomes questionable or fades away. If indeed they were as substantial as they otherwise might seem, this would be impossible. This does not necessarily mean that there is not a right or a wrong answer to the question about what really is good, and of course it does not mean that it makes no difference which answer you choose. As much as anything else within the world, the answer one accepts, decides who one is and what course one's life will take. What anxiety reveals is that no thing and no one can tell you the answer, can tell you what is really important, what the ultimate ends, the highest priorities for a life should be. If there were something or someone could tell you that answer apart from a standard one has already accepted in terms of which something would count as the answer, then things would once again regain the meaning that is missing in anxiety. But no one and nothing can, then there is no firm ground from which to make a decision, but since each life is always explicitly or implicitly guided by some sense of an ultimate end or highest priority for a life, one cannot avoid making a decision until such a firm ground emerges.

Perhaps there are other modes of access to this insight than the experience of anxiety as Heidegger describes it, but even if that is true, the basic point stays the same. No thing and no one can tell you what the ultimate norms for a life should be—or better put—no one can tell you who to listen to (people try to tell us all the time) about the ultimate norms, the highest priorities for a life, except in terms of end or priorities that we have already accepted as valid. If those are precisely what is in question, then this is indeed a rather unsettling experience, especially if you would like to have something solid and substantial to tell you what is and is not good and important, and thereby to provide a reliable guide for action.

§ 4. The Null Ground of a Negativity

In everyday life, it looks like the answer is settled or at least like there is some firm ground for settling the issue. I take it that one of the main differences between authentic and inauthentic being-a-self is that in authentic being-a-self, one is aware that there is no firm ground outside of oneself to which one can appeal to find out what the ultimate end or the highest priority for a life should be. Since Heidegger explicitly states that the description of Dasein presented in the First Division of Being and Time is taken primarily from everyday life, i.e. inauthentic selfhood, and since the Second Division, where he introduces the term «originary temporality» is concerned with authentic selfhood, we should pursue the hypothesis that an analysis of how the self in being authentic confronts the questions concerned the highest priority for a life tells us something significant about what originary temporality is and what it does and does not entail.
We recall that our problem was how to identify the good, the for-the-sake of which or ultimate end that will give meaning to a life and serve as a guide to action and an orientation point to sort out what is important from what is unimportant and which things and events within the world are relevant and in which ways. In distinction to Plato (but probably in concert with Aristotle, depending on one’s reading of Aristotle), Heidegger makes clear that the ultimate end is not outside of life, but itself a way of living one’s life, *i.e.* the good as living well. If it is something envisaged or projected, then it is the projection of a way of living that sets the standards for all the things that can happen as a help or a hindrance, as fortuitous or calamitous. For instance, for some people, managing a stock portfolio might be a burden they could do without as long as they have enough to get by. For others, it would be an awful misfortune reflecting on who they are as an individual to be someone without substance, as they used to say about people without wealth. The question of the good is the question of what is important in life. That is why the individual ends like prestige or wealth might seem to be ends in themselves, but since our ultimate priority is a certain life, then they are subordinate to the way they contribute to the kind of life that I envisage as the one that is projected as good. This may be devoted primarily to a specific, more narrowly defined end (*e.g.* becoming a great artist), but more typically it probably involves a number of individual ends that I pursue as part of a good life as a whole.

What kind of life should I envisage as good? Once again, we recall no one or nothing can tell us the answer. In fact, even the call of conscience that Heidegger sees as calling one to authentic existence, speaks «silently» for precisely this reason. If conscience could tell us the answer, then it and not *Dasein* itself would be the source of meaning and direction.

So if there is an answer it has to be one for which I am responsible. Even if I choose an answer that I take from someone or somewhere else — revealed religion, my ethnic background, my friends, my teachers — then it is I who have done so and no one else. Heidegger terms — I don’t think, inappropriately — «freedom» the fact that I am the one who accepts this answer that sets the overall priorities in my life, and has a certain view about the significance of events and things within the world for me. Moreover, not just freedom in general, but «freedom towards death».

Why does he call it «freedom towards death»? I would like to suggest that this is intimately connected with the way that *Dasein* is the ground of its choices through the adoption of a *Wurzwillen* that, precisely because it is ultimate, cannot be

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2 *SuZ*, p. 266; *cfr.* Wm Wassen der Grund, p. 51.
grounded in anything else. It is freedom, among other things, because it involves a choice and because no one and nothing can determine this choice for Dasein.

My teacher, Werner Marx, faulted Heidegger the philosopher in Being and Time, for having overlooked what he called the «miracle of freedom» and making it an ontological and «epistemological» principle by describing it primarily as «Lichtung» that allows things to emerge as the things they are, but misses the relationship to choice and to praxis that we commonly and rightly associate with the phenomenon of freedom. What I have tried to do with this reading is show that Heidegger’s description of this phenomenon as «freedom» does share those traits with the traditional concept. It is about a choice, and it is about a choice that is not determined outside of Dasein. It does indeed have ontological significance because it sets out the context against which things can show up as the kinds of things they are, but since what it above all concerns is the «Woruumwollen» of a life that is Dasein’s own, this is not a matter of theoretical classification as much as it is about what things matter and what things don’t and how they matter—are they to be embraced or avoided, valued or shunned. And it not only has practical implications, but if this interpretation is correct, then it is this primary choice that determines what one should and must do. If the examples of «ways to be» are taken simply from the everyday activities of Dasein, then the kind of practical concerns one is describing are things like «building a house» or «being a chemist» whose value is presupposed and the predicates for objects within the world are simply utility-characteristics. But if, in authentic Dasein, what one realizes is that the question is what gives meaning to a life, then the question goes far beyond utility and what is up for debate is not just how best to accomplish a given aim, but rather what the proper aim for a life in general is.

To say that it is «freedom towards death» is another way of stating what he calls in Vom Wesen des Grundes the «finitude» of human freedom. In that essay, the finitude (expressed also by claim that freedom is not only the «ground», but also the «Ab-grund» of Dasein, that it is the «Ohrmacht» of Dasein whether this originary event occurs) is connected with the fact that freedom is something that «happens to us», and that our choices are «finite». Dasein projects, en-visages a Woruumwollen, but it does so as thrown. It is not free not to choose, Dasein does not get to decide whether to decide; moreover, at any point where the moment of authentic decision arrives, Dasein discovers that it has already been making basic decisions all along whether it knew it or not. In Being and Time, the finitude that I am or rather enact at each moment (what he calls «being-towards-the-end» or «constantly dying»), is brought out by such phrases as the «impossibility of Dasein», or my being as «das (richtige) Grund-sein einer Nichtigkeit». Another limit he points out in this connection is the fact that Dasein necessarily projects itself into possibilities into which it is thrown (e.g. I did not choose to be born into a modern technological age

any more than someone else chose not to, but our possibilities are very different nonetheless). He stresses that Dasein never has complete control over its existence, making clear that even authentic Dasein is not synonymous with a kind of self-consciousness that is completely autonomous and transparent to itself. It is not a subject conceived of in the modern sense. Rather human life as Dasein is always the choice about priorities that it does not make all on its own, but rather «adopts», «appropriates», «takes on». Moreover, it is also limited through the fact that the choice, as a genuine choice, means that to choose it involves failing to choose another. If I set financial success as my highest goal, I have not made having time for my family, pursuing knowledge for its own sake, or sense pleasures my highest goal. If I adopt one of the others as my highest goal, then I have not chosen financial success as my highest priority and thereby make it much less likely that I will actually achieve it. If I choose a balance of financial success, professional satisfaction, contribution to my family and my community as my highest priority, I am likely to be less successful at any one of them than I would be if I made that my exclusive priority. «Freedom however exists only in the choice of the one, that means in bearing the not-having chosen, and not-having-been-able-to-choose the others». The finitude of freedom also means that fallleness is not an accident, but rather because the choice is necessary, realized in concrete actions that involve interaction with things in the world (that are not under my complete control) and other people, it also involves not just holding possibilities open as such, but seizing one of them not as a possibility but as the actual priority that guides my actions and my refraining from acting.

§ 5. Originary Temporality as the Ecstatic Origin of Modality

The most important «not» of this nullity is the fact that the projection of a Worumwollen as an envisaged opens up the «not» of possibility in general. The possibilities revealed through the vision of a «Worumwollen» are not mere abstract possibilities, they are possibilities to be realized or avoided, longed for, hoped for, worked for or feared. But whatever they are, they are not merely what is, but what is or is not to be. The opening of a normative dimension takes one beyond mere facts, which is why Heidegger says they open possibilities as such. And, as Heidegger stresses over and over, the «facts» that confront Dasein are never mere theoretical facts. Rather, whatever things confront us in our strivings do so as the kinds of things they are precisely because of the way that they relate to those strivings. So we can explain how Heidegger can say that originary temporality as the opening of the «not» that one actively confronts in authentic existence and that also permeates everyday existence — even though there we are not aware that we are the source of it — is not itself something temporal in the everyday

\* Loc. cit.
sense at all. It is what opens up the future as those things and events that are not yet here, but as the dimension within which life is to be lived in a certain way. It not only opens up the dimension in which what has been up until now is not what must be or will be any longer. It determines whether what has been was successful or unsuccessful, satisfying or unsatisfying, in light of the standard opened up by this most basic vision. Modality then confronts us in originary temporality in terms of what should or must be done; what should not have or should have been done; and, as the vision that guides Dasein at each moment, it makes its life the kind of life one actually is actually living right now.

It is this originary event of opening up a dynamic relationship of Dasein to its life so that the «not» of «not-yet» and of «no longer» present themselves to us as possibilities that we enact and have been enacting all along, whether we knew it or not, that Heidegger calls «ecstatic». This event forms the background for our everyday notions of temporality as an ordered succession of events. Another name for this originating event of temporality that Heidegger uses in both Being and Time and in the essay on «The Essence of Grounds» is «the transcendence of the world». In § 69 of Being and Time, Heidegger gives a brief description of how the theoretical world emerges out of an abstraction from the realm of praxis that dominates our everyday lives. Hence, if it is true that originary temporality can be said to be the origin of normativity in general that grounds all practical modalities of what should be, could be, must be, and is, and if specific practice interests within the sphere of everyday practice could be shown to be the origin of the theoretical realm, then theoretical modalities such as possibility, necessity, and actuality would also be able to be traced back to the awareness of practical possibility, necessity, and actuality from which they emerge. It would take much more careful phenomenological analyses than what I have provided or could even begin to try to provide today. However, especially for those familiar with Husserl’s later project of showing how the realms of ideal objects and the realms of nature can be traced back to the life-world and his earlier project of showing how the naturalistic attitude has its roots in the personalistic attitude, we can get a pretty good idea of how such an undertaking would proceed. My intention today has been simply to outline in a very general way why this project would be consistent with themes from Heidegger’s early work and to suggest that the phenomena that Heidegger is describing in those works are both genuine and important.

\footnote{John van Buren has provided a detailed account of the sources for Heidegger’s linking originary temporality to the moment of decision (van Buren, John, The Young Heidegger, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994, pp. 157-202). His analysis, like Kierkegaard’s (op. cit.), sees Jaspers’ reading of Kierkegaard as the most important source, along with Paul, but he also names Augustine, Luther, and Pascal.}
§ 6. Toleration

What is also important about Heidegger, if this reading is correct, is that the formality of the structures he describes and the fact that the call of conscience is silent means that it is well possible for it to be heard in various cultures, for it to be heard very genuinely, and still to be heard in different ways. If this is true, though, what does it imply for toleration? Here, I am much less confident than I am about what Heidegger means about originary temporality or how it serves as the origin of modality, including practical modalities such as the desirable or the obligatory for Heidegger. In fact, my opinion swayed back and forth ever since I submitted the abstract for this paper.

In the abstract, I suggested that one thing that follows from the reading presented in the first sections of this paper is that the recognition of other entities who also have Dasein as their form of being (I will use the traditional term and call them «persons») would be the recognition that these persons, whether they know it or not, are also the ultimate source of the meanings their lives have for them and that nothing and no one — including me — should or really can make their choice for them. We might call this a formal, transcendental, or ontological kind of respect. It is a recognition about a structural fact about persons that follows from their existence as Dasein.

Still, the question arises about what specific other obligations follow from that fact, especially whether this recognition entails any specific moral obligations: Does it tell me anything about the kinds of attitudes and behaviors that I must or should exhibit towards them if their priorities and their choices are different from mine? What if from my perspective their choices look foolish, irresponsible, or even reprehensible to me? Are there any moral duties that this recognition places on me that in some way limit the kinds of priorities I may set for my life? Or, to use a specific example, can I authentically make domination of other individuals, races, or nations my own goal or the common goal of the group I belong to? How may, should, or must I respond if some other person or group decides to make domination of others their goal?

In the abstract for this paper, I suggested that no specific content is stipulated or ruled out by the formal recognition of the personhood of others, that everything specific would follow from the specific Worumwollen that I choose. If I see it as important to live a life that is decent and just according to the standard of traditional Christian or Enlightenment moralities, then it would be impossible for me to approve of violating others' legitimate needs and wants in order to dominate them. If I see a successful life as one in which I am governed by and successfully implement the impulse to dominate others, it makes sense that I may and will set the domination of others as my goal and will see my life (or the life of anyone else for that matter) as successful if that is achieved and unsuccessful if it is not. I will
be aware that others do not see it this way, but I will understand that this is because their priorities in life are different from mine.

So, following this reasoning, the formal recognition of the fact that others are free to set their own priorities that may be different from mine places no limitation on what mine may be, and therefore, the ethical or moral constraints that I face depend upon the choice I make. They do not follow necessarily from this formal recognition, but from the specific view of the good that I find compelling, and hence they may or may not conform to what have traditionally been seen as the moral obligations that I have towards other persons as free agents.

On the other hand, though, it does seem odd that a desire to dominate or a willingness to exploit others against their will for my own pleasure or advantage could be consistent with an authentic awareness of my own freedom and the freedom of others. Can it be consistent to grant a person his or her formal freedom at the same time that my actions or those of my group deny them the rights that we normally associate with basic social and political conceptions of freedom? Our colleague, Professor Zeljko Loparic, for example, has argued that a stronger reading of the passage from SzuZ’s § 60 that Paul Gyllenhammer quoted in his lecture\textsuperscript{6}, would entail the obligation to grant other persons the rights commonly associated not only with the transcendental freedom to choose their priorities in life, but also the everyday social and political freedoms necessary to act upon and exercise that freedom. The passage reads: «The resolute openness to oneself makes it possible for *Dasein* to allow the other to “be” in its ownmost potentiality for Being and to disclose it in anticipating-liberating solicitude (...). Out of authentically being-a-self arises for the first time an authentic being-with-each-other (...)»\textsuperscript{11}. This certainly sounds like a call not only for tolerance, but for an ethical comportment that recognizes the other as someone invested with the same freedom and rights as one’s own. So it seems a contradiction not to follow along something like the traditional Kantian argumentation about what is entailed by recognizing the other as a person also.

Unfortunately the brevity of the quotation does not make it clear what precisely follows from this new «possibility». Moreover, it is stated as a possibility and not as a necessity. Finally, if the obligations towards others that follow from this possibility are such as to constrain the choices that it is reasonable or acceptable for me to make, if certain kinds of priorities are excluded from the outset due to an insight into the nature of *Dasein*, that seems to contradict the statements in

\textsuperscript{6}The papers presented by Professor Loparic and Professor Gyllenhammer can be found in the Toleration Congress web page (http://www.pucp.edu.pe/eventos/congresos/filosofia/). See also Loparic, Zeljko, «A linguagem objetificante de Kant e a linguagem não-objetificante de Heidegger», in *Acta Fenomenológica Latinoamericana*, vol. II, Lima/Bogotá: PUCP/San Pablo, 2005, pp. 35-49.

\textsuperscript{11}SzuZ, § 60, p. 198.
other sections I mentioned above where Heidegger referred to the call of conscience as «silent» and he stated that an essential feature of resolute choice is its «Unbestimmtheit» or «indeterminacy».

So in the absence of other, clearer passages, it seems we are faced with a dilemma and that it would require some significant interpretive work to come to a clear conclusion about which of these readings is more consistent with what we might want to call Heidegger's position on the matter in *Being and Time*. A lot will depend upon what one's general views about this work are and what systematic position one holds with regard to ethical obligations towards others. One who is positively disposed to *Being and Time* and inclined towards the position that recognizing the social and political rights of others is a duty that no reasonable person could dispute will be inclined to read the passage in such a way as to show that Heidegger too recognizes this fact. Someone who holds such an ethical position, but has less trust in merit of this work—especially in light of his involvement with National Socialism soon afterwards—will be less inclined to such a reading and more inclined to see *Being and Time* as a disturbingly amoral work. Someone who is inclined towards Heidegger, but believes that arguments about why one should be moral involve fundamental decisions that cannot be universalized or someone who believes that conventional Western moral systems just are nothing other than social conventions will probably be less inclined to believe that the passage above implies that these kinds of moral duties follow from authentic resoluteness, and welcome Heidegger's insight into the fact that he has seen they do not.

In any case, I think that all of these positions can agree that what *Being and Time* does show is that for Heidegger, the ultimate responsibility for the priorities that govern one's life and the actions that follow from them rest with the individual person, whether this person knows it or not, and that no one and nothing can relieve the person of that responsibility. Moreover, in authentic choice the agent is aware that a life consistent with traditional views about the inherent freedom and dignity of other individuals is to become an authentic choice for an individual, it must be chosen as something that is a life that is inherently better than its opposite and is chosen not because an external agent demands it, but because it is the life that the agent who chooses it has decided is indeed the best life for her.